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PATENT POOL OUTSIDERS
Michael Mattioli†

ABSTRACT
Individuals who decline to join cooperative groups—outsiders—raise concerns in
many areas of law and policy. From trade policy to climate agreements to class action
procedures, the fundamental concern is the same: a single member of the group who drops
out could weaken the remaining union. This Article analyzes the outsider problem as it
affects patents.
The outsider phenomenon has important bearing on patent and antitrust policy. By
centralizing and simplifying complex patent licensing deals, patent pools conserve
tremendous transaction costs. This allows for the widespread production and competitive
sale of many useful technologies, particularly in the consumer electronics industry. Because
these transaction-cost savings appear to outweigh the most common competition-related
concerns raised by patent pools, antitrust authorities generally view these private groups
favorably.
Others are less sanguine. Most patent pools are incomplete: for the technologies they
cover, not all relevant patents are included. The reason for this is understandable. Patent
holders sometimes believe they can negotiate for higher royalties by declining to join an
existing pool. Antitrust regulators are aware of this behavior but do not worry much about
it. A growing number of economists and legal scholars believe, however, that this outsider
behavior may impose higher costs on pool licensees, detracting from the central benefit
that patent pools offer—transaction cost savings. These commentators urge antitrust
regulators to regard patent pools with greater caution and skepticism.
These calls for caution, however, are based mostly on theories about how patent pools
should work, rather than on empirical studies. Remarkably, little research has been done
to shed light on the actual impact of patent pool outsiders. Through an original
ethnographic study, this Article seeks to remedy this gap. A set of the most notable and
public episodes of outsider behavior were collected from industry press reports, case reports,
and historical archives. Crucial new information was then gathered through interviews with
lawyers and executives directly involved with the episodes studied.
The study reveals a characteristic of patent pools that has gone unappreciated until
now: they subtly but powerfully influence bargains that take place “poolside”—i.e., deals
between patent holders and licensees that take place “in the shadow” of the pool. This
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spillover effect can beneficially limit the power that theorists have assumed outsiders have.
This is an unappreciated benefit of cooperation. The theorists, as it turns out, have not
used the wrong approach, but rather, have been missing some important parameters.
To further aid regulators, this Article builds upon its qualitative findings by
introducing a new quantitative technique for estimating the cost that a licensee either incurs
or saves due to an outsider. Applying this technique to original financial and industry data
gathered from research subjects, this Article shows that, counterintuitively, patent licensees
are sometimes better off where cooperation among licensors is partial, rather than
complete. The inflection point lies where the royalty rate hike that a unified pool would
need to charge to draw in an outsider is equal to the transaction costs that licensees would
conserve by dealing with a single pool.
This study’s revelations have provocative implications that reach beyond patent law.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, slightly fragmented property markets may sometimes
be preferable to “grand coalitions.” There may exist in any given market for complementary
patent rights (or other complementary property rights), an optimal level of diffusion of
ownership that resides between total diffusion and total concentration. Some cooperation
may not only be better than none, but also better than more.
Drawing upon this study, antitrust regulators who must evaluate patent pools can
assemble a clearer and more complete understanding of their overall costs and benefits.
This Article is also helpful beyond patent law. The ethnographic methodology followed
here reveals dynamics between outsiders and groups that theory alone has not captured.
Scholars concerned with outsiders in other areas of law and policy can refine and build
upon theory by applying a similar ethnographic approach.
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INTRODUCTION

A sense of unraveling is in the air. Scholars and experts in far-flung
corners of law and policy are growing concerned that outsiders—individuals
who decline to join economic, legal, and social collaborations—will upend
important policy goals. Ask an international trade expert about outsiders,
and you may learn why Britain’s 2016 decision to withdraw from the
European Union could undermine and weaken the remaining federation;1
ask an expert on climate governance, and you may learn that the United
States’ decisions to abstain from key treaties could cause cooperation among
other nations to dissolve;2 ask commentators in corporate law, meanwhile,
and you may hear concerns that a sole creditor can disrupt a cooperative
plan to divide an insolvent company’s or nation’s debts. 3 In the grand
cathedral of law, the outsider concern has become a resounding echo: a
rogue litigant undermines the efficiencies of a class action by objecting to
settlement terms;4 a solitary property owner causes a nuisance by refusing to
1. See Guido Calabresi & Eric S. Fish, Federalism and Moral Disagreement, 101
MINN. L. REV. 1, 17 (2016) (discussing the potential impact of weak versus strong central
governments on Britain’s decision to leave); Paul Craig, Brexit: A Drama in Six Acts, 41
EUR. L. REV. 447, 460 (2016) (discussing some issues plaguing the EU resulting in a “social
legitimacy deficit”); Horst Eidenmüller, Negotiating and Mediating Brexit, 44 PEPP. L.
REV. 39, 49 (2016) (warning of “detrimental long-term consequences for the Union as a
whole” were other Member States to follow the pathway that the U.K. has forged).
2. See generally Daniel H. Cole, The Problem of Shared Irresponsibility in
International Climate Law, in DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 290 (André Nollkaemper & Dov Jacobs eds., 2013) (examining
how outsider nations that refused to join the Kyoto Protocol affected the underlying goals
of the federation of countries that did join).
3. Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232, 238
(1987) (“Even when a single creditor and the firm overcome these impediments, they
cannot readily strike their own deal and ignore the other creditors, because value will flow
from the consenting creditor to the holdout creditors.”); G. Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N.
Klee, Sovereign Piracy, 56 BUS. LAW. 635, 636 (2001) (discussing the “holdout creditor”
issue in connection with competing interpretations of a discussion of a “pari passu” clause,
“a standard clause found in almost all sovereign bond indentures”); Lee C. Buchheit & G.
Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 EMORY L.J. 1317, 1324 (2002)
(“Holdout creditors could use this threat of liquidation to extract preferential settlements
at the expense of the debtor and the other creditors.”).
4. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal
Obligations, 91 B.U. L. REV. 87, 100 (2011) (discussing class action outsiders); Brian T.
Fitzpatrick, The End of Objector Blackmail?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1623, 1624 (2009)
(explaining that “[t]he holdout problem in class action litigation” stems from an objector
to a settlement); Georgene Vairo, Is the Class Action Really Dead? Is That Good or Bad
for Class Members?, 64 EMORY L.J. 477, 519 (2014) (discussing situations in which

MATTIOLI_FINALFORMAT_06-24-18 (DO NOT DELETE)

236

6/24/2018 6:22 PM

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:233

cooperate with a neighborhood plan; 5 a venture capitalist threatens the
future of a young company by opportunistically pulling out of a cooperative
round of funding;6 a reluctant juror stands in the way of a just ruling by
rejecting the conclusions of her fellow jurors.7 It seems that outsiders are
everywhere, threatening the good that can come from cooperation.8
Today, one of the most important debates over outsiders concerns
patents. A growing number of economists and legal scholars believe that
patent holders who refuse to join patent pools—cooperative licensing
clearinghouses—will undermine and sometimes entirely undo the benefits
that pools deliver.9 Such outsider behavior has been on the rise in recent
years. 10 Commentators who subscribe to this theory urge antitrust
regulators, who must evaluate patent pools, to regard pools more skeptically
than they currently do.11

defendants have the right to walk away from a settlement if a threshold percentage of
plaintiffs do not participate). See, e.g., In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 185 F. Supp.
2d 519, 521 (D. Md. 2002) (“[Plaintiffs] would have a right to opt out, and, if there were
a certain number of opt-outs . . . Microsoft would have the right to withdraw from the
settlement.”).
5. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in
Three Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1040–42 (2008) (discussing nuisance
doctrine with respect to holdouts and outsiders).
6. See, e.g., Joseph L. Lemon, Jr., Don’t Let Me Down (Round): Avoiding Illusory
Terms in Venture Capital Financing in the Post-Internet Bubble Era, 39 TEX. J. BUS. L.
1 (2003); Usha Rodrigues & Mike Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation: The
Evolution of SPACS, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849, 856 (2013) (discussing a study of voting
procedures in the context of special acquisition corporations that “created what turned out
to be a costly holdout right”).
7. See, e.g., Influences on the Jury, 45 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 643, 656
(2016) (“A judge who concludes that the jury cannot overcome a deadlock may . . . declare
a mistrial.”). See generally Jeffrey Abramson, Anger at Angry Jurors, 82 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 591 (2007) (describing a holdout juror’s role in hung juries); Shari Seidman Diamond
et al., Revisiting the Unanimity Requirement: The Behavior of the Non-Unanimous Civil
Jury, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 201 (2006) (providing empirical data on holdout behavior on
juries); Alison Markovitz, Jury Secrecy During Deliberations, 110 YALE L.J. 1493 (2001)
(discussing the relationship between the holdout juror and jury deliberations).
8. Richard Epstein noted insightfully that holdouts and externalities can disrupt an
efficient allocation of resources. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities,
and the Single Owner: One More Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553 (1993).
9. See infra Section II.B.1.
10. Id. (enumerating recent episodes).
11. See, e.g., Reiko Aoki & Sadao Nagaoka, Coalition Formation for a Consortium

Standard through a Standard Body and a Patent Pool: Theory and Evidence from
MPEG2, DVD, and 3G at 2–3 (Inst. of Innovation Research Hitotsubashi Univ.,
Working Paper No. 05-01, 2005), http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/
15986/1/070iirWP05-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/547A-HXBJ].
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This “Patent Outsider Theory,” as we might call it, is more provocative
than it sounds. Patent pools are important to the consumer technology
industry, and by extension, to the entire U.S. economy.12 That is because
they address a big problem: transaction costs. Technology standards that
the developed world relies upon, such as LTE data and MPEG streaming
video, cannot be commercialized without the permission of many different
patent holders. 13 Because dozens of patent holders often hold essential
pieces of the puzzle, the transaction costs of negotiating a deal with each
individually would be phenomenally high.14 A patent pool addresses this
problem by granting manufacturers and service providers permission to use
the necessary patents through a single agreement. Licensees agree, in return,
to pay standard royalty rates, which the pools divide among the patent
holders—i.e., their members. By minimizing the number of licensing
transactions that must take place, patent pools reduce transaction costs that
would otherwise persist.15 The benefits are far-reaching. Anyone who has
owned a smartphone, video game console, personal health device, or
12. See generally Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual
Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293 (1996)
[hereinafter Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules]. For a body of work examining
different aspects of patent pools, see, for example, FLOYD L. VAUGHAN, THE UNITED
STATES PATENT SYSTEM (1956); Michael Mattioli, Power and Governance in Patent
Pools, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 421 (2014); Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual
Property Transactions: The Case of Patent Pools, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY
123, 129–30, 132, 144 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter Merges, The Case
of Patent Pools].
13. In the consumer electronics industry, many of these technologies are standards,
such as formats for digital video, wireless data communications, and the like. As of this
writing (March 2018), one of the largest patent pool administrators in the country is
MPEG LA, a company that oversees thirteen patent pools for various standards and is
overseeing the development of a future pool. Many of these pools have formed in just the
past five to ten years. For more information, see the MPEG LA website. Revolutionizing
Intellectual Property Rights Management, MPEG LA, www.mpegla.com/main/
Pages/About.aspx [https://perma.cc/LTB8-K2Q9] (last visited Mar. 11, 2018); see also
Justin R. Orr, Patent Aggregation: Models, Harms, and the Limited Role of Antitrust, 28
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 525, 553 n.159 (2013) (describing the role of patent pools in
producing MPEG technology).
14. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698–700 (1998); Michael
Mattioli, Communities of Innovation, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 103, 110–13 (2012)
(presenting historical and current case studies of this issue); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the
Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 124–26 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001).
15. See Robert P. Merges & Michael Mattioli, Measuring the Costs and Benefits of
Patent Pools, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 281, 297, 319 (2017) (providing estimates of the
transaction costs pools conserve and associated methods of deriving these methods).
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modern television has benefited directly from the work that patent pools
do.16
How could a sole outsider upset this happy state of affairs? Theorists
imagine the following: if an important patent holder refused to join a patent
pool and demanded greater royalties than it would otherwise receive as a
member of that pool—i.e., supracompetitive prices—licensees would have
to pay higher royalties than they otherwise would.17 Those higher royalties
would offset at least some of the transaction cost savings the pool provides
to those licensees.18 This might motivate other companies to pull away from
the pool. It is easy enough to spin out hypothetical problems that might
follow: faced with prohibitively high licensing costs, some would-be
licensees might decide to focus on other (less preferred) products and
services. With fewer competing manufacturers to purchase goods from,
consumers could encounter higher prices. Meanwhile, the reduced patent
licensing activity could weaken the incentive that patents represent, thus
dampening research investments. It brings to mind the old proverb, “for
want of a nail, the shoe was lost; for want of a shoe, the horse was lost,” and
so on, until a battle, a war, and an entire kingdom are lost, “all for want of
a horseshoe nail.”19 That’s how the theorists see it, at least.
This Article suggests that the theorists have it wrong. This conclusion
is drawn from an original set of case studies that reveal new information
about real-world constraints that limit the power of patent pool outsiders.
Most significantly, by publicizing their royalty rates, patent pools signal
information to licensees about the value of patents in the pool, as well as the
related patents outside of the pool. In addition, the outsider strategy
presents considerable risks to patent holders. These factors have not been
identified or reported on in the literature on patent pools. The research
draws upon news articles, press releases, and court papers that describe
important outsider episodes. This Article also uniquely provides deeper
insight through information that was captured in semi-structured
interviews with lawyers and executives who were directly involved with
important episodes where patent holders preferred to license patents outside
of pools. In addition to illustrating the constraints that pool outsiders are
under, these case studies reveal some unappreciated aspects of patent pools

16. As explained in Part II, patent pools have facilitated the use of digital video
standards that the devices listed in this sentence use. These standards include, for instance,
MPEG-2 video, Bluetooth, and LTE.
17. See infra Section II.B.1.
18. Id.
19. A notable example of this ancient proverb appears in Benjamin Franklin’s 1758
book, The Way to Wealth. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE WAY TO WEALTH (1758).
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that may be relevant in other cooperative settings. This evidence does not
suggest that the theorists have it wrong because they have approached the
outsider problem incorrectly, but rather, that they have been missing some
important dynamics.
This conclusion has important implications for antitrust policy. As
mentioned earlier, antitrust regulators evaluate patent pools because, for all
of their benefits, pools can raise competition concerns. The chief concern,
as explained in greater depth in Part II of this Article, is that a pool may
suppress competition between two substitutive technologies by placing
them both within the pool.20 Aware of this risk, antitrust regulators have
long sought to weigh the benefits and the costs that individual patent pools
offer.21 In a 2017 article, Robert Merges and I argued that on average, the
benefits of patent pools appear to far exceed their costs. 22 Interestingly,
antitrust authorities have long assumed that outsiders are not detrimental to
patent pools.23 In general, the Department of Justice (DOJ) views patent
pools favorably. In public advisory notices, the DOJ has expressed its view
that, absent any unrelated concerns, antitrust authorities will view some
cooperation among patent holders as better than none.24
To sum up: the concern about outsiders voiced by academic theorists is
at odds with the long-held (but unsupported) assumptions of antitrust
regulators. This Article offers the first empirical view of this topic, and it
suggests that the regulators have it right: outsiders do not appear to
20. See infra Section II.A.
21. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION
AND COMPETITION (2007), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/
2007/07/11/222655.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z6C4-2HTM]
[hereinafter DOJ
GUIDELINES].
22. Merges & Mattioli, supra note 15 (concluding that on average, patent pools do
far more good than harm).
23. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to William F. Dolan & Geoffrey Oliver, Jones Day 7 (Oct. 21, 2008),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/busreview/238429.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6PWN-EEYP] [hereinafter RFID Business Review Letter] (“Not all owners of potentially
blocking patents are currently members of the Consortium—and these owners may never
join it—potentially limiting efficiency gains. Failure to realize all potential efficiencies does
not mean, however, that the efficiencies created are noncognizable.”). In their
communications licensees, patent pools have acknowledged the possibility of outsiders as
well. See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., No. CIV. 02-2060-B(CAB), 2007
WL 2900484, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2007) (“Moreover, the MPEG LA sublicensee
agreement explicitly warns that the MPEG LA pool does not necessarily include all the
patents necessary to practice the technology and that sublicensee signs the agreement aware
of such risks.”).
24. RFID Business Review Letter, supra note 23.
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significantly reduce the transaction costs that patent pools conserve. This
information has short-term and long-term value to regulators: in the shortterm, it provides empirical support for a long-held assumption that has
recently been called into question; in the longer term, it urges against a
change in how regulators regard patent pool outsiders in the future. Since
the nineteenth century, regulators’ attitudes toward patent pools have
vacillated pendulum-like, between periods of distrust and periods of favor.25
Although regulators are currently friendly toward pools, the pendulum
seems likely to swing backward in the future. To further aid regulators, this
Article introduces a new quantitative technique for estimating the realworld cost that a licensee either incurs or saves due to an outsider.
This leads to a second surprising discovery. Drawing upon pricing and
pooling information collected from interview subjects involved in major
pools, this Article argues that, under some circumstances, slightly
fragmented property markets are preferable to “grand coalitions”—i.e., a
pool containing all relevant patent holders. This argument assumes that a
unified patent pool would need to entice outsiders to join by offering
royalties either equal to or greater than the royalties outsiders already collect
independently.26 Because patent pools typically compensate their members
according to simple royalty-division formulas, this implies that a pool would
need to deliver proportionally higher royalties to all members. A pool that
unifies in this way would charge licensees higher royalty rates than the sum
of the individual rates that licensees must pay to a partially complete pool
and to an outsider. Stated more simply, complete unification may often be
undesirable because it entails the cost of luring in outsiders. Outsiders may
not be powerful, but multiplication is. These results should be helpful in
advancing the scholarly debate, and more practically, to antitrust policy.
This Article’s lessons extend beyond patent law. Considering the
widespread concern over outsiders in so many areas of law and policy, this
Article shows that an ethnographic approach based upon interviews and
novel documentary evidence can add critical information that theoretical
models are missing. The argument is not that an economic analysis of
outsiders is inappropriate, but rather, that such an analysis can yield more
accurate and complete results when the dynamics of the situation are well
25. See Michael Mattioli, Empirical Studies of Patent Pools, in 2 RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Peter S. Menell
et al. eds., forthcoming 2018).
26. Based on the interviews conducted for this Article, the decision to join a patent
pool is almost entirely an economic one. Although pool membership may theoretically
carry spillover benefits—i.e., constructive working relationships with other companies,
signaling to inventors—such benefits do not appear to factor prominently into the decision
to join a pool.
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understood. Experts in other domains far removed from patent and antitrust
law may find the approach taken here helpful.
The Article unfolds in three parts: Part II explains the relationship
between patent pools and federal policies that promote competition and
innovation. Part II builds on and summarizes prior research showing that
the benefits of patent pools tend to outweigh their costs. The discussion
then turns to the recent concerns over patent pool outsiders through a
review of recent economic and legal scholarship. Part III presents a set of
case studies of outsider behavior in action. These episodes do not support
the theory that outsiders meaningfully detract from the benefits patent pools
offer. Importantly, these case studies lay out new findings that help explain
why, as regulators have long guessed, patent pools can still be very helpful
even when they do not contain all of the essential patents involved. Part IV
presents a new method that antitrust regulators can use to assess the impact
of outsiders on patent pools. Applying real-world data gathered in this
study, the Article yields broad new insights that are helpful to policymakers.
II.

BACKGROUND

Patent pools can be helpful or harmful: on one hand, they conserve vast
transaction costs; on the other hand, they can dampen competition. Most
scholarship on patent pools has focused on these potential costs and
benefits. Recently, however, some scholars have voiced a new concern: they
argue that the primary benefit patent pools offer—transaction cost
savings—may not be as robust as most experts believe. As a patent pool
becomes more economically important, the incentive will grow for some
patent holders to “go it alone.” They predict that this behavior can impose
high royalty licensing fees on licensees, thus offsetting the transaction costs
that pools conserve.
Outsider behavior appears to be on the rise in patent pools. As one
subject interviewed for the study in Part III of this Article stated, “this is
happening more and more, as patent pools have higher difficulties attracting
patent owners.”27 Whether outsiders are truly a problem for pools and for
licensees remains an open question. If antitrust authorities are convinced
that outsiders are a concern, however, they may regard patent pools less
favorably than they presently do. This Part lays the groundwork for the
empirical study presented in Part III by discussing these concerns in greater
detail.

27. Email from Subject #3 to author (July 18, 2017) (on file with author).
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PATENT POOLS, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITION

John Donne’s oft-quoted line, “no [one] is an island,” aptly captures the
role patents play in technology markets.28 Many of the products and services
that fuel the U.S. economy today incorporate thousands of related patented
inventions. A widely-cited 2012 study estimated that the average
smartphone, for example, incorporates approximately 250,000 patented
technologies.29 A lion’s share of the patents that make up these vast mosaics
are owned by technology companies.30
In this environment, patent licensing is important and potentially
problematic. In theory, any patent holder that blocks the use of a patent
essential to a product or service could impede commercialization of that
technology. 31 Manufacturers and service providers thus must achieve a
daunting goal: they must obtain many licenses from many patent holders.
Even for firms with ample capital and resources, the transaction costs
required could be steep—so steep, in fact, that the licensing might often not
take place.32 Scholars in law and economics sometimes call this unhappy
outcome, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons”—a term Rebecca Eisenberg
and Michael Heller coined to describe the underuse of patented inventions
due to high ex ante costs of aggregating rights.33
Patent pools address this licensing muddle by serving as
clearinghouses. 34 Groups of patent holders typically form pools to grant
licensees (usually manufacturers) permission to use their sets of related
patent rights through unified licenses. Today, most patent pools are
administered by independent companies with specialized legal and business
expertise. These companies help establish pools and handle the ongoing
work of furnishing manufacturers and service providers with licenses,
collecting royalty payments from them, and then dividing those funds
among patent holders. Two of the most prominent patent pool
28. JOHN DONNE, DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS (1624).
29. See RPX Corp., Securities Registration Statement, Amendment No. 3 (Form S1), at 59 (Apr. 18, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1509432/
00011931251110 1007/ds1a.htm [https://perma.cc/8HSA-D2ST].
30. In this Article, the term “technology companies” refers to companies that
specialize in computer hardware and software, as well as related digital devices and services.
Readers should note that many patents are owned by universities and nonpracticing entities
(“NPEs”) as well.
31. See infra Section II.B.1 (explaining this in greater detail).
32. This is commonly referred to as “The Complements Problem.” See, e.g., Shapiro,
supra note 14, at 122–24 (explaining the complements problem as it applies to patents).
33. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 699–700.
34. See Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 12, at 1319 (discussing
the clearinghouse function of pools).
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administrators in the United States are MPEG LA, LLC, based in Denver,
and Via Licensing Corporation, located in San Francisco.35
Patent pools deliver considerable benefits to their licensees, patent
holders, and consumers. By offering collections of patents under standard
licensing terms, they remove the need for manufacturers and service
providers to negotiate a series of individual licenses. 36 Patent holders,
meanwhile, can draw a stream of royalties from a potentially large set of
licensees. Since the 1850s, this elegant cooperative model has enabled the
growth of entire industries, from sewing machines, to steel, to airplanes and
cars, to critical drugs and medical procedures, to wireless data, to digital film,
to television distribution.37 Today, patent pools are particularly important
in the field of consumer technology standards. Anyone who has ever
listened to a compact disc, used a smart phone, owned a video game console,
or watched a DVD has directly benefited from the work of patent pools.38
Even in the realm of patent licensing, however, there is no such thing
as a free lunch. Alongside the transaction costs that they conserve, patent
pools can generate social costs if they are not carefully designed. One such
cost can result from reduced competition. Suppose a patent pool includes
two patented technologies that do the same thing but in slightly different
ways. In antitrust parlance, such technologies are called “substitutes.”39 By
bundling two substitute technologies in a single license, a patent pool could
charge consumers more for both patents than the sum of what each patent
would command in a competitive licensing market. 40 Considering this
possibility, it is unsurprising that patent pools have long been scrutinized by
antitrust regulators.41
35. See Current Programs, MPEG LA, http://www.mpegla.com/ [https://perma.cc/
ZN6V-WAC3] (click on “Current Programs”) (last visited Mar. 11, 2018); Licensing
Programs,
VIA
LICENSING,
http://www.via-corp.com/us/en/licensing.html
[https://perma.cc/NFZ6-F5P6] (last visited Oct. 31, 2017).
36. See Richard J. Gilbert, Ties That Bind: Policies to Promote (Good) Patent
Pools, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 8 (2010).
37. See Mattioli, supra note 12, at 431–39, 444, 449 (discussing and analyzing the
royalty division rules in historical patent pools relating to these technologies); Vaughan,
supra note 12, at 39–68 (discussing historical pools covering these technologies).
38. As explained in Part III of this Article, these products all rely upon MPEG-2
video.
39. See DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 21, at 74–78.
40. See id. at 77 (“[A] pool containing substitutable patents, i.e., patents covering
technologies that compete with each other and that licensee producers would choose
between, may have the anticompetitive effect of increasing the total royalty rate to
licensees.”).
41. See Merges & Mattioli, supra note 15, at 328, 335–36 (explaining that such
scrutiny has lately been ad hoc and qualitative).
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Some commentators argue that patent pools can also dampen
innovation. A patent pool that requires its members to offer a royalty-free
license back to the pool covering any future patents the licensee acquires
could, in theory, suppress the incentive of exclusivity that patents ordinarily
represent. Some scholars believe that companies subject to such “grantback” clauses may choose to reduce their innovation investments. 42 The
result could be a net drop in innovation, higher prices for consumers, or
both. Because of these possibilities, antitrust regulators and courts have long
attempted to determine whether individual pools do more harm than
good.43 This has generally been an imprecise, highly qualitative exercise.
In a 2017 article, Robert Merges and I sought to aid regulators in this
regard by providing the first empirically grounded estimates of the costs and
benefits of patent pools.44 We first presented original methods of calculating
the transaction cost savings that pools provide and the potential social costs
they impose. We then applied those methods to financial data we obtained
directly from leading patent pool administrators. Ultimately, we concluded
that the transaction costs that modern patent pools conserve appear to
greatly exceed the potential social costs they might impose. We estimated
that a patent pool organized around popular video and audio standards saves
the consumer electronics industry conservatively between $400 million and
42. See id. at 59–62 (discussing the potential social welfare costs of grant-backs); U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 31 (2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/
files/documents/public_statements/1049793/ip_guidelines_2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2ZBC-DGAR] (“Another possible anticompetitive effect of pooling
arrangements may occur if the arrangement deters or discourages participants from
engaging in research and development, thus retarding innovation.”).
43. See, e.g., DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 21, at 2 (“The Antitrust Division of the
U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (the ‘Agencies’)
frequently address complex antitrust questions related to conduct involving the exercise of
intellectual property rights in enforcement actions, reports, testimony, reviews of proposed
business conduct, and amicus curiae or ‘friend of the court’ briefs filed in the federal courts
of appeals and the Supreme Court.”). For a discussion of the DOJ’s view of patent pools,
see id. at 8–9.
44. See generally Merges & Mattioli, supra note 15. Our study was prompted in part
by recent calls for greater antitrust regulation of pools. See, e.g., Steven C. Carlson, Patent
Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 383 (1999) (“[T]he DOJ and
the FTC should not adopt a per se rule of legality for the pooling of blocking patents, and
that they must carefully stipulate the permissible bounds of those pools deemed
procompetitive”); Scott Sher, Jonathan Lutinski & Bradley Tennis, The Role of Antitrust
in Evaluating the Competitive Impact of Patent Pooling Arrangements, 13 SEDONA
CONF. J. 111, 112 (2012) (“[A]ntitrust enforcement can and should take a more central
role in the evaluation of the competitive effects of mass marketed patent pools containing
thousands of separate and likely competing patents”).
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$600 million dollars.45 On the other side of the equation, potential costs
associated with lost competition or innovation appear to be far lower. 46
Patent pools might not deliver a “free lunch,” but they look like a remarkably
good bargain.
B.

THE OUTSIDER QUESTION

Recent scholarship has shown that most modern patent pools do not
include all of the patents that relate to the technologies they support.47 Anne
Layne-Farrar and Josh Lerner estimated in a recent study, for instance, that
the most “complete” modern pools contain eighty-nine percent of the
patents that a licensee might need. 48 The least complete pools, they
estimated, contained as few as ten percent of the necessary patent rights.
They also estimated that “most pools contain roughly one-third of the
eligible firms.”49 In 2015, Justus Baron and Tim Pohlmann built upon this
work by examining even more pools and reported consistent findings. 50
Most patent pools, it would seem, are not grand coalitions.51
One reason why patent pools are incomplete in this sense is that they
often form through a gradual process. Groups of technology companies
usually collaborate to design technology standards. 52 This work is often
mediated by standard-setting organizations (SSOs).53 SSOs often require
collaborators to promise that they will declare any standard-essential patents
(SEPs) that they hold and to license any such patents under “fair, reasonable
and non-discriminatory” (FRAND) terms.54 This standard-setting process
usually comes before any patent pool forms. Only later, once a draft of the
45. See Merges & Mattioli, supra note 15, at 319–24.
46. Id. at 327–38.
47. See Anne Layne-Farrar & Josh Lerner, To Join or Not to Join: Examining Patent
Pool Participation and Rent Sharing Rules, 29 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 294, 299 (2011).
48. See id.
49. Id. at 298.
50. See Justus Baron & Tim Pohlmann, The Effect of Patent Pools on Patenting and
Innovation – Evidence from Contemporary Technology Standards 13–16 (Feb. 2, 2015)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-faculty/
searlecenter/innovationeconomics/documents/Baron_Pohlmann_effect_of_patents.pd
f [https://perma.cc/RCJ9-V8YJ].
51. See Gilbert, supra note 36, at 17 (“The grand coalition is the set of all the relevant
players.”).
52. See generally Jorge L. Contreras, Patents, Technical Standards and StandardsSetting Organizations: A Survey of the Empirical, Legal and Economics Literature, in 2
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:
ANALYTICAL METHODS (Peter S. Menell et al. eds., forthcoming 2018) (providing an
overview of interoperability standards and standards setting organizations).
53. Id. at 3 (working version).
54. Id. at 17 (working version).
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standard has been finalized, might some of the collaborators work toward
forming a pool.55 Typically, the organizers of such a pool issue a public call
for patents and hire an independent expert to evaluate whether any declared
patents are essential to the standard. This two-step process—standardsetting followed by pool formation—is a hallmark of pools designed around
modern technology standards.56
Layne-Farrar and Lerner cleverly estimated the participation rates in
modern standards-based patent pools by comparing the numbers of patents
included in those pools with the total numbers of patents declared (by their
owners) to be essential to those pools.57 They explained that the difference
between these numbers could be the result of deliberate, calculated outsider
behavior, or simply by disagreements concerning essentiality: “for those
firms that do join [pools],” they wrote, “their patents are subject to an
independent review for essentiality and not all patents declared as essential
to a standard are actually found to be so.”58 On its own, this evidence does
not reveal whether the apparent lack of coverage in modern pools is the
result of strategic outsider behavior or simply disagreements between patent
holders and evaluators about essentiality.
But then Layne-Farrar and Lerner investigated patent pool
participation more deeply. They examined whether patent holders were
more likely to seek membership in patent pools that stood to compensate
them relatively well.59 Patent pools compensate their members by divvyingup royalties paid to the pool by licensees according to simple formulas.60
Most commonly, these formulas are based upon pro-rata or per-capita
divisions.61 This “rough and ready” approach to royalty sharing is attractive
to many patent holders because it makes licensing simple, certain, and
enables a volume of licensing that would otherwise be difficult and costly.62
Layne-Farrar and Lerner found that firms that possibly owned essential
patents were less likely to seek participation in pools with royalty-division
55. See Jorge L. Contreras, When a Stranger Calls: Standards Outsiders and
Unencumbered Patents, 12 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 507, 510–12 (2016).
56. Since the 1850s, patent pools have formed differently in many industries. Some
have been collective solutions to litigation among patent holders, while others have been
in response to pressure exerted by the federal government. See Mattioli, supra note 14, at
119–47.
57. Layne-Farrar & Lerner, supra note 47, at 297–301.
58. Id. at 298.
59. Id.
60. See Mattioli, supra note 12, at 439–55, 463 (cataloging royalty division and
apportionment in historical and present-day pools).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 446 (referring to this as a “rough and ready” approach).
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rules that stood to undercompensate them.63 This finding, they explained,
is suggestive of a deliberate outsider behavior rather than a disagreement
over essentiality.64 The authors did not conclude, however, that this kind of
imperfect cooperation is a practical problem for pools.

1. The Concerned View of Outsiders
To understand why outsider behavior concerns some scholars, it is
helpful to introduce two intertwined concepts: holdouts and the
complements problem.65 Hold-out situations often arise when a prospective
property buyer or licensee needs to strike deals with many individual
property owners. A canonical example is the development of a shopping
mall that will sit where a set of individually-owned lots exist. 66 Upon
learning that his or her rights are essential to the developer’s plan, each
property owner has an incentive to drive a hard bargain.67 Trouble arises,
however, if the owners of these complementary property rights individually
demand prices that lead to an unworkable aggregate for the prospective
buyer. 68 If one or more property owners demand royalties that are high
enough, no deals will be made, rendering all parties worse off.69 This is the
complements problem.
In a 1999 article in the journal Science, Michael Heller and Rebecca
Eisenberg argued that a similar dynamic may play out in patent licensing
markets—i.e., that a single patent holder aware that it can block access to a
necessary technology could hold out for high royalties.70 If multiple patent
63. See Layne-Farrar & Lerner, supra note 47, at 296; see also Peter Bright, New
Patent Group Threatens to Derail 4K HEVC Video Streaming, ARS TECHNICA (July 23,
2015, 9:55 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/07/new-patent-groupthreatens-to-derail-4-hevc-video-streaming/ [https://perma.cc/EU4Q-Y76A] (“If those
companies are unhappy with MPEG LA’s terms, they don’t have to participate. It appears
so far that at least five companies have decided to do just that: HEVC Advance claims
General Electric, Technicolor, Dolby, Philips, and Mitsubishi Electric as members.”).
64. Id.
65. The first discussion of this problem is typically credited to the French
mathematician AUGUSTIN COURNOT. See AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO
THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH 103–04 (Nathaniel T.
Bacon trans., 2d ed. 1971) (1838) (explaining the problem).
66. See, e.g., Richard McGregor & Yu Sun, China’s ‘Nail House’ Floors Developers,
FIN. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2007, at 6 (offering a real-life example of this holdout behavior).
67. See Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust
Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1160 (2009) (discussing the holdout or holdup dilemma);
Shapiro, supra note 14, at 124–29 (same).
68. Shapiro, supra note 14, at 125
69. Cf. id.
70. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 698. Arti Rai has also written important
foundational commentary on modern patent pools in the biopharmaceutical industry and
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holders behave in this way, with no regard for their impact on the overall
cost for would-be licensees, the technology may become too costly to
license. They famously termed this outcome “The Tragedy of the
Anticommons.”71 The authors acknowledged, however, that patent pools
could overcome this problem.72 Robert Merges later developed this point
into a landmark publication that offered some optimism: patent pools
themselves are the evidence, Merges argued, of the power of private actors
to wisely overcome holdout situations and the related complements
problem.73
Outsiders (as the term is used in this Article) are like traditional
holdouts, but they imply some unique dynamics. Like the holdout, the
outsider pressures a buyer or licensor for supracompetitive rates. Unlike the
holdout, however, the outsider can also lean upon a set of insiders—i.e., a
group of complementary rights holders. The outsider seeks to bargain in the
shadow of this cooperative group, trading off its efficiencies.74 In doing so,
the outsider can theoretically not only demand high rates from licensees,
but also exert pressure on the insiders by demanding a larger share of the
pie in exchange for its cooperation.75
in the consumer technology industry—including the pools studied in this Article. See Arti
K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role of
Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 848 (2001) (“To be sure, the
MPEG-2 and DVD patent pools represent something of a high-water mark of
procompetitiveness in a patent pool.”).
71. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 698.
72. See id. at 701.
73. See Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 12, at 1319.
74. François Lévêque & Yann Ménière, Technology Standards, Patents and
Antitrust, 9 COMPETITION & REG. NETWORK INDUSTRIES 29, 34 (2008) (“Still, some
patent owners may prefer not to participate in the patent pool so as to take advantage of
the collective self-discipline accepted by those who did join the pool. This hold out problem
arises basically because an essential patent owner can always charge a higher price if it
manages to set its price after the others.”). For the foundational discussion of the
“bargaining of the shadow” concept, see generally, Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225
(1982).
75. In other words, this expanding body of scholarship suggests that cooperative
failures not only lead to suboptimal licensing, but also that at least some patent holders
waste capital in ill-fated efforts to prevent that very result. See also Steffen Brenner,
Optimal Formation Rules for Patent Pools, 40 ECON. THEORY 373, 374 (2009)
(discussing the outsider problem as it affects the welfare-enhancing aspects of patent
pools); Gilbert, supra note 36, at 17–18 (discussing the factors that might make joining a
pool more or less compelling to an individual patentee); Daniel Quint, Pooling with
Essential and Nonessential Patents, 6 AM. ECON. J. MICROECONOMICS 23, 34 (2013)
(noting that the outsider problem “creates a free rider problem which may prevent pools
from reaching their optimal size”); Gastón Llanes & Joaquín Poblete, Ex Ante Agreements
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Scholarly concerns about patent pool outsiders first surfaced in a paper
written by Reiko Aoki and Sadao Nagaoka, published in 2005. The paper
examined the factors that might lead patent holders in different industries
to become pool outsiders.76 The authors presented an economic model that
explained how outsiders who negotiate in the shadow of established patent
pools could, under some circumstances, demand higher royalties than the
pool would deliver. The outsider can free-ride, they posited, off the
efficiencies and certainty of licensing enabled by the pool.77 Their model
suggested, however, that this will usually tend to happen when the number
of essential patent holders is large.78 In settings where few patent holders
operate, they predicted that a “grand coalition” is possible.79 Considering
the large numbers of essential patents in modern standards pools, the
authors concluded, “there is indeed a risk of the tragedy of anti-commons.”80
In a 2003 California Law Review article, Michael R. Franzinger
expressed similar concerns relating to a patent pool designed to cover 3G
wireless technologies. 81 The wireless giant, Qualcomm, Franzinger
explained, was vocal in its reluctance to join the pool. Franzinger posited
that this may have been because Qualcomm drew its revenues primarily
from licensing rather than manufacturing. 82 “Especially for a
nonmanufacturing patent holder who only wishes to license out its
technology and not to obtain reciprocal licenses from others,” he wrote,
“there would seem to be no good reason to join the Platform.”83 Franzinger
added, “[t]he lack of full industry-wide participation may dilute the
in Standard Setting and Patent Pool Formation, 23 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 50,
50 (2014) (studying the effects of “pool-formation rules on technology choice, prices, and
welfare”).
76. See Aoki & Nagaoka, supra note 11, at 3. The authors explained that “[t]he
breakdown of an integrated patent pool,” caused either by an outsider, or by the splintering
of the pool into multiple licensing groups, “not only raises the total price to be paid by the
licensees but also reduces the joint profit of the patentees.” Id.
77. See id. at 8; see also Mattioli, supra note 12, at 439–51 (indicating that patent
pools allocate royalties to their members through formulas agreed upon when the pool is
created).
78. See Aoki & Nagaoka, supra note 11, at 21 (“[T]he emergence of an outsider is
inevitable [because] . . . a firm can gain by becoming an outsider and [this] gain increases
as the coalition of the other firms expands.”).
79. Id. at 21 (“[A] grand coalition can be implemented only if the number of essential
patent holders (n) is small.”).
80. Id. at 22.
81. Michael R. Franzinger, Latent Dangers in a Patent Pool: The European
Commission’s Approval of the 3G Wireless Technology Licensing Agreements, 91 CALIF.
L. REV. 1693, 1706 (2003).
82. See id.
83. Id.
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competitive benefits of [a patent pool] more than it dilutes its dangers,” and
concluded that the risk of “capture” presented by patent pool outsiders is
significant and deserving of policy intervention.84
In a 2010 article, the esteemed economist Richard Gilbert observed that
“patentees are not compelled to negotiate with other patentees” to address
a collective negative externality.85 Gilbert explained that the more a pool
thrives, the greater is there a rational impulse for members to defect.86 In
the context of patent pools, Gilbert wrote:
The more the pool succeeds in lowering royalties and avoiding
transaction costs, the greater is the benefit from independent
licensing of an essential patent. The incentive to leave the pool (or
not join in the first place) is analogous to the incentive to defect
from a cartel. By restricting output and raising prices, harmful
cartels make it profitable for a firm to act as an independent
competitor.87

Gilbert analyzed the outsider problem through the economic theory of
the core—a framework that examines the ability of players in a given
economic setting to form beneficial coalitions.88 “In the patent example,” he
explained, “the core exists if every patentee prefers its payoff when part of a
pool that consists of all patentees to the payoff it could get in any different
coalition of patentees.”89 Gilbert further added that “[p]atent owners that
choose to remain outside a pool can unravel the benefits from pooling by
interfering with one-stop shopping and by demanding high royalties.”90
It is helpful to synthesize these concerns into a coherent picture. One
concern appears to be that licensees will pay more in settings where a sole
licensor operates outside of a pool than they would pay if the same patent
holder had joined the pool.91 If this cost difference is great, it might shut
84. Id.; see id. at 1727.
85. Gilbert, supra note 36, at 17 (“The grand coalition is the set of all the relevant
players.”).
86. Id. at 16–8.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 18.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 28.
91. It is helpful to distinguish this concern from the concern that royalty-free crosslicenses between pool members can give them an unfair advantage over licensees. Kenneth
Flamm argued that this advantage became unfair in the DVD landscape as the price of
manufacturing the technology dropped: “Within a few short years, however, the royalties
charged by the DVD patent pools evolved into truly significant sums relative to the total
cost of manufacturing optical disk drives (ODDs)—indeed they now account for the
majority of manufacturing cost for a potential entrant.” Kenneth Flamm, A Tale of Two
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some would-be licensees out of the market. A related concern has to do with
the effect that outsiders have on the overall cohesion of the pool. If every
member of a pool acts on a rational impulse to “go it alone,” the group will
splinter apart, setting the stage for an anticommons.
Although there have been no empirical studies of the impact of patent
pool outsiders, Jorge Contreras’ recent study of patent infringement lawsuits
brought by “standards outsiders” helps illuminate this discussion. 92
Contreras was interested in patent holders unencumbered by FRAND
obligations. He identified lawsuits where such “standards outsiders”
brought suits against technology producers.93 Contreras’ research goal was
to see whether “[the standards outsiders] could potentially seek rents in
excess of the rates received by [insiders].” 94 Contreras found that suits
brought by outsiders make up an appreciable proportion of all assertions of
standard-essential patents.95 He also found that the companies that bring
these suits most often are so-called nonpracticing entities. 96 These
conclusions are concerning, but they leave open the question of what
impact, if any, patent pool outsiders have on the efficiencies pools offer.
Industry stakeholders and market analysts are often concerned by
outsiders as well. In 2015, for instance, industry commentators warned that
the existence of two 4K video patent pools “threatened to derail” the future
of streaming videos by increasing the cost of licensing of the underlying
technology. 97 In 2012, when Nokia, Apple, and Google withdrew from
patent pooling efforts related to the LTE wireless data standard used by
smartphones, similar predictions were reported in the Wall Street Journal.98

Standards: Patent Pools and Innovation in the Optical Disk Drive Industry 20 (Nat’l
Bureau
of
Econ.
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
18931,
2013),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18931.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z42Q-2RX3].
This
criticism is not really about the outsider problem, however.
92. See Contreras, supra note 55.
93. Id. at 507.
94. Id. at 520.
95. Id. at 535.
96. Id. at 518–19.
97. Stephen Shankland, Next-gen High-res Video Faces New Fees and Uncertainty,
CNET (Mar. 26, 2015, 6:40 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/patent-group-raisesnew-fees-uncertainty-for-4k-video/
[https://perma.cc/T3RK-ZZ7N].
(“‘[The
introduction of HEVC Advance] creates confusion in the market,’ especially given MPEG
LA’s pool of patents from 27 different patent holders, said Frost & Sullivan analyst Dan
Rayburn. ‘They put out a press release that scares a lot of content owners, and then won’t
give any details . . . I’ve got content owners saying this is bad for my business.’”).
98. See Don Clark, Plan to Pool LTE Patents Takes Shape, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 3,
2012, 8:01 AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2012/10/03/plan-to-pool-lte-patents-
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A few years earlier, industry analysts made similar comments about the 3G
wireless data and MPEG-2 video patent pools, each of which did not
include important patent holders.99

2. The Sanguine View of Outsiders
Antitrust authorities have assumed that patent pool outsiders are not a
problem. Their assumption is simply that some pooling is more helpful than
none at all. 100 This optimistic view is supported by ample anecdotal
evidence: as mentioned earlier, many important industries appear to have
flourished due to patent pools. If outsider behavior was truly a problem, one
would expect to see far fewer successful pools, as well as lower
commercialization and higher prices of the technologies around which they
are organized.
In a 2006 paper, Douglas Lichtman suggested why this might be. He
made the important point that outsiders could be companies that are known

takes-shape/ (acknowledging that some companies tend to act independently when it
comes to patent matters).
99. See Franzinger, supra note 81, at 1706. (“The lack of full industry-wide
participation may dilute the competitive benefits of the Platform more than it dilutes its
dangers.”); Vikrant Narayan Vasudeva, Patent Valuation and License Fee Determination
in Context of Patent Pools, CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (July 9, 2014), https://cisindia.org/a2k/blogs/patent-valuation-and
-license-fee-determination-in-context-ofpatent-pools [https://perma.cc/4895-W3U6] (“Correspondingly, if the patent pool does
not contain all the patents it cannot curtail royalty stacking issues for the users. For
example, Alcatel-Lucent pursued infringement claims for patents that it alleged covered
the MPEG-2 standard and were not in the pool.”).
100. See, e.g., Letter from Joel Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
Garrard R. Beeney, Esq., Sullivan & Cromwell 13 n.58 (Dec. 16, 1998),
https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/04/27/2121.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EJ3W-5JH7] [hereinafter DVD Business Review Letter]
(“Transaction costs to licensees would almost certainly be somewhat lower if these later
patents were included in the pool, instead of being subject to separate negotiations.
However, the fact that this pool might not enable the realization of all potential efficiencies
of pooling patents in this area does not mean that the efficiencies that it does create are
insubstantial or that the arrangement is anticompetitive or unlawful.”); RFID Business
Review Letter, supra note 23, at 8 (proposing that a pool will yield cognizable efficiencies,
although those efficiencies may not be as great as they would be if the pool contained all
essential patents); Gilbert, supra note 36, at 26 (“Nonetheless, even partial pools that do
not include all patents that are necessary to make or use a product offer considerable savings
in transaction costs and can mitigate royalty stacking compared to separate licensing with
independent patentees.”); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty
Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2014–15 (2007) (“Such a patent holder might well
maximize its revenues by staying out of a proposed patent pool and asserting its patent
rights independently, unless it believes that its failure to join the pool will undermine the
formation of the pool and thus seriously hinder sales of the product in question.”).
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before a technology is in widespread use or after the fact.101 In the former
case, an outsider theoretically would possess only the power to demand
royalties that reflect the marginal value of its patents. This would be
because, if an outsider’s demands are viewed as excessive by prospective
licensees (which may include pool members), given enough time, the
industry can simply adopt a different technology in place of the one holdout. Lichtman theorized that patent holders that assert themselves after a
technology is in widespread use, meanwhile, may ironically be in a poor
position if there are very many of them. Just as a creditor can only receive a
smaller share of the pie if it is one of many, Lichtman posited, in a market
that can only pay a limited maximum rate, each of many outside licensors
can only have a weak leverage. 102 Lichtman believed that licensees have
more power and that patent holders are more farsighted than the pessimists
have guessed. These predictions cast doubt on the outsider concern. As
Lichtman explained, the risk of being one of many holdouts fosters “less of
an incentive for a firm to strategically delay in the hopes of being a patent
holdout, and less of an incentive for an accidental patent holdout to actually
bring suit.”103
Another possibility is that pools set a practical baseline for independent
licensors. A recent dispute between Microsoft and Motorola suggests this
is so. In Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., the Ninth Circuit instructed
that a patent pool may serve as a useful data point in determining a
“reasonable” rate under a FRAND obligation.104 Jonathan Barnett posited
that multiple complementary patent licensors may “signal” royalty rates to
one another, leading to an aggregate cost that is workable.105 As the study
presented in Part III of this Article shows, Barnett is correct.
In addition, patent owners do not always sue unlicensed users. Herbert
Hovenkamp and Eric Hovenkamp suggest that a licensee will not be
“meaningfully blocked as a matter of fact” if, “for example, . . . there is a
widespread belief that a blocking patent is invalid, such that competitors are
willing to practice the blocked technology without a license

101. See Douglas G. Lichtman, Patent Holdouts and the Standard Setting Process 1–
3 (Univ. of Chi. John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper, Paper No. 292, 2006).
102. See id. at 6–7.
103. Id. at 6.
104. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1043 (9th Cir. 2015)
(“Motorola provided no evidence that its patents were more valuable than the other
patents in the pool.”).
105. See Jonathan Barnett, From Patent Thickets to Patent Networks: The Legal
Infrastructure of the Digital Economy, 55 JURIMETRICS 1, 41–42 (2014).
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notwithstanding the risk of an infringement suit.” 106 This accords with
Rebecca Eisenberg’s observation—which has been echoed by other
scholars—that many patented technologies are used without permission
with no legal consequences for the infringer.107 Because of this, Eisenberg
notes, the effective reach of a patent may fall short of its nominal reach.108
This reasoning suggests that the same may be true for patent pools: a pool
that does not contain all patents that relate to a technology may nonetheless
be effectively complete if the outsiders permit the unlicensed use of their
patents.
On one side of this debate, economic theory urges greater concern over
patent pool outsiders; on the other side, the long-held intuition of regulators
is that these independent patent holders do not meaningfully detract from
the transaction costs that pools mitigate. If the theorists have it right, then
regulators may wish to rethink their long-held assumptions; if, on the other
hand, regulators are correct that outsiders dampen the benefits of patent
pools, then academic debate on this subject could be meaningfully
advanced. The next Part presents the results of an original study that adds
new empirical insights to this debate.
III.

AN ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDY OF PATENT POOL
OUTSIDERS

This Part presents a study of patent pool outsiders—i.e., episodes where
essential patent holders have declined to join pools and instead licensed
independently.
A.

METHODOLOGY

The methodology followed here was deeply influenced by the work of
Nobelist Elinor Ostrom, who famously developed the Institutional Analysis
106. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK JANIS, MARK LEMLEY & CHRISTOPHER R.
LESLIE, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 34.04[C] at 34-8 (3d ed. 2016).
107. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Has the Academy Led Patent Law Astray?, 32
BERKELEY TECH L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (arguing that unlicensed infringing uses are
extremely common); David J. Teece, The “Tragedy of the Anticommons” Fallacy: A Law
and Economics Analysis of Patent Thickets and FRAND Licensing, 32 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (arguing that uncompensated, infringing uses are net more
harmful to innovation than patent thickets); Rebecca Eisenberg, Patent Costs and
Unlicensed Use of Patented Inventions, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 53, 53–54 (2011) (“Empirical
work suggests that unlicensed use of patented inventions is common in research . . .
Unlicensed use is likely pervasive in other settings as well, including commercial
production.”).
108. See Eisenberg, supra note 107, at 55–56.
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and Design (IAD) framework. Using this approach, which entails defining
broad categories of inquiry, Ostrom and the many scholars she inspired have
shed light on how groups manage shared resources (including property
rights) in a variety of settings.109 Katherine Strandburg, Brett Frischmann,
and Michael Madison have recently adapted the IAD framework to the
study of “knowledge commons,” such as patent pools. 110 Inspired and
informed by this body of work, this Article adopts a similar ethnographic
approach.111
This study analyzes the following research question: “Do outsiders
(independent licensors) impose significant costs on licensees or otherwise
undermine the transaction costs conserved by patent pools?” I focused my
research on the following research topics112: (1) the technological, industrial,
and social contexts in which outsider episodes occurred; (2) the patents
involved, including their numbers and their relationships to the patents in
pools; (3) the firms and institutions involved; (4) the motivations and goals
of the licensors and pool administrators involved; (5) the internal
governance rules of the pools and outside licensors involved; (6) outcomes,
with a focus on costs and benefits.
This work began with a broad literature review. To learn about the topic
and to identify potential case studies and research study subjects, I searched
through newspaper and industry press archives for well-documented
episodes of patent pool outsiders. Because this work revealed several
episodes that involved litigation, I carefully studied lawsuits by reviewing
court decisions, docket filings, and corporate press releases, such as
109. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 182–85 (1990). For an
example of an ethnographic approach applied to study outsiders outside of patent settings,
see generally Cole, supra note 2 (examining how outsider nations that refused to join the
Kyoto Protocol affected the underlying goals of the federation of countries that did join).
Surprisingly, outsiders in that setting not only failed to weaken, but in fact strengthened,
coalitions of rights-holders.
110. See generally Peter B. Meyer, An Inventive Commons: Shared Sources of the
Airplane and Its Industry, in GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 341 (Brett M.
Frischmann, Michael J. Madison & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2014).
111. The methodology carried out borrowed heavily from the IAD framework but did
not formally adhere to that framework in every respect. See Michael Mattioli, The DataPooling Problem, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 179, 224 (2017) (describing an analogous
targeted application of the IAD framework). More specifically, aspects of the IAD
framework that were not relevant to the central question under examination were not
employed.
112. Brett M. Frischmann et al., Governing Knowledge Commons, in GOVERNING
KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 1, 20 (Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison & Katherine
J. Strandburg eds., 2014).
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announcements of settlements. Because the DOJ reviewed the pools
examined, this study gathered helpful details from publicly available letters
exchanged between pool organizers and the Antitrust Division of the
DOJ. 113 I also gathered critical information about pool composition
(patents, membership, and licensees) from the websites of patent pool
administrators. Archived copies of these same webpages revealed pool
membership data from earlier points in time. 114 In some cases, publicly
available annual reports to shareholders were reviewed as well.
With a preliminary record assembled, I sought to construct a deeper and
richer understanding by interviewing individuals directly involved with
selected outsider episodes. I contacted and interviewed executives and
lawyers who work for the largest patent pool administrators in the United
States. I then interviewed executives and counsel at large technology
companies, some of which were members of pools, and some of which were
outsiders of prominent pools.
All interviews were conducted by telephone and email in a semistructured fashion and focused on a set of interview questions that I shared
with the individuals beforehand. The questions were divided into two lines
of inquiry: the impact of outsider behavior on patent pools generally, and
questions pertaining to specific case studies. Most conversations led to
follow-up emails and phone conversations. In the interest of clarity, the
findings are reported here in three sub-parts: a set of general observations
followed by two deep case studies.
A note on the selection of case studies: there are many episodes of
outsider behavior that can be analyzed. This study proceeded on the premise
that depth would be more helpful than breadth. Rather than cataloging as
many outsider episodes as possible, the goal was instead to provide deep and
nuanced portraits of this behavior. The first two modern-day patent pools,
covering MPEG-2 video and DVD, were selected because they revealed a
rich variety of dynamics and because they are related to one another, as
explained in the discussion that follows. Research subjects opined that these
two episodes offer lessons that are broadly applicable. Research subjects also
offered high-level insights on outsider behavior, generally. This information
is presented first.
113. See Business Review Letters and Request Letters, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/atr/business-review-letters-and-request-letters [https://perma.cc/
RL84-WSWG] (last updated Dec. 27, 2017).
114. Historical copies of these pages were gathered from the Internet Archive. See
About the Internet Archive, INTERNET ARCHIVE, https://archive.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/ TU5V-7PEB] (last visited Mar. 11, 2018).
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Relatedly, although great efforts were made to avoid bias, it is possible
that selection bias is present. Selection bias is a fundamental challenge in
nearly all ethnographic work, and the challenge is heightened where the
sample size—i.e., the number of cases observed—is small, as it is here.115
To minimize this risk, I analyzed as many relevant episodes as I could find
and based my “general” category of questions on what those episodes
appeared to reveal. Research subjects explained that the two selected case
studies illustrate important dynamics between outsiders and patent pools. It
is possible that the individuals who agreed to be interviewed for this study
may, by coincidence, happen to share similar subjective opinions. To
minimize the odds of this, the interviews include a range of experts on
different sides of the outsider issue—i.e., outsiders, insiders, and pool
administrators—however.
An additional challenge is the fact that the only episodes that could be
explored deeply were those in which patent pools had successfully taken
form. At least one licensor speculated that a “critical mass” of licensors must
agree to join a patent pool for any cooperation to take place at all. Because
there is little to no available information on point, it is very difficult to
examine pools that might have formed but did not. Fortunately, however,
this study can comfortably leave such episodes out of the analysis: the
purpose of this Article is to offer insights to antitrust regulators who are
tasked with examining patent pools that have necessarily gathered sufficient
critical mass.
B.

THE UNAPPRECIATED INFLUENCE OF POOLS

This section describes general observations that interview subjects
shared about patent pools and outsiders who decide, for various reasons, not
to join a pool. The two case studies that follow this discussion illustrate the
insights summarized here.
As a threshold matter, interview subjects explained that it is difficult to
say with certainty if any patent pool contains “all” of the necessary patents
involved. “There’s no way to know whether you have all of the patents in a
pool,” one subject commented. 116 He added, “there might be unknown

115. See AMY R. POTEETE, MARCO A. JANSSEN & ELINOR OSTROM, WORKING
TOGETHER 36 (2010) (“Small samples present two serious limitations: selection bias and
indeterminacy. A sample is biased if the cases observed do not represent variation on the
dependent or independent variable accurately.”).
116. Telephone Interview with Larry Horn, President & CEO, and Bill Geary, Vice
President of Bus. Dev., MPEG LA, LLC (Feb. 23, 2017) [hereinafter Telephone
Interview with Horn & Geary] (on file with author).
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patent holders at the time of a pool’s formation.”117 Another subject stated
that it is almost “inevitable” that there are one or more independent or
outside patent holders.118 Some are, this subject explained, nonpracticing
entities that own patents that “just happen, by coincidence, to read on the
standard to which the pool relates.”119
These observations capture a fundamental insight: patent pooling is not
neatly analogous to real property assembly, such as the canonical land
development example discussed in Part I. Unlike the land developer who
can know with certainty the underlying property rights that she must gather
before breaking ground, a technology manufacturer can never be entirely
sure of every possible patent that might read on its product. This is because
the boundaries of patent rights are inherently less certain than those of real
property. 120 Relatedly, the validity (and hence, the enforceability) of the
patents identified is generally less certain than the rights of a property
owner. 121 The operative question for manufacturers, then, might not be
whether a pool contains “all” of the relevant patents in existence, but rather,
whether the pool helps licensees obtain permission from the companies
most likely to sue them for infringement. Stated differently, the technical
or nominal coverage of a pool may be less important than its effective
coverage.
Moving beyond this threshold observation, the most important insight
shared by research subjects is that patent pools significantly influence the
royalty rates that outsiders can ask for and receive. By publishing their rates,
patent pools signal the value of the portfolios of patents they offer. This
gives licensees a basis to negotiate rates for other essential patents outside
of the pool. As one subject stated, “there is no doubt that the royalties asked
by a major pool influence the royalties asked by other patent holders.”122
Another explained that the royalty rate offered by the pool not only limits
the power of the outsider, but also “lowers negotiation costs by orders of
117. Id.
118. Telephone Interview with Ruud Peters, Exec. Vice President & Advisor,
Koninklijke Philips N.V. (July 15, 2017) (on file with author).
119. Id.
120. Real property is defined by geographic coordinates. By contrast, the metes and
bounds of patents are defined by claim language, which is inherently more subject to
interpretation and validity challenges. See Clark D. Asay, The Informational Value of
Patents, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 259, 270 (2016) (discussing this common analogy).
121. David J. Teece, The “Tragedy of the Anticommons” Fallacy: A Law and
Economics Analysis of Patent Thickets and FRAND Licensing, 32 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1489, 1504 (2016) (discussing the impact of uncertainty with respect to validity on
damages calculations).
122. Email from Subject #5 to author (July 11, 2017) (on file with author).
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magnitude for all licensing done in the shadow of the pool.”123 Yet another
subject added, “the patent pool sets a de facto market reference.”124
A pool’s rate signals a ballpark sense of value. It would be a mistake to
assume that a patent pool’s influence can be boiled down to a simple “perpatent” measure of value. One reason for this is that the composition of
patent pools is dynamic. Old patents expire, new patents join, and all the
while, the royalty rate charged by the pool does not rise or fall in response.125
As a result, a simple per-patent calculation would problematically yield a
frequently shifting baseline for outside negotiations. Alongside this problem
is the fact that a single invention can spawn many patents. This is because
inventions are often patented in different countries, and claims are
sometimes split into divisionals.126 Complicating licensing matters further,
the same invention may not always be represented by the same number of
patents in different countries. (A product that requires ten U.S. patent
licenses to manufacture might require only seven German patent licenses,
for instance.) This explains why the influence of patent pools on outside
negotiations is not so simple as a per-patent pool rate.127 Although some
research subjects referred to the “per-patent” value of pools, further
discussions clarified that this term was used imprecisely. A more helpful
(but still imperfect) way to gauge a pool’s influence on outside
negotiations at any point in time might be “per-invention” or “per-patent-

123. Email from Subject #4 to author (July 15, 2015) (on file with author).
124. Telephone Interview with Subject #3 (July 19, 2017) (on file with author).
125. Many pools, such as those administered by MPEG LA, drop their royalty rates
over time, but this is not caused by the removal of patents. These decisions are made at the
time of pool formation and discussions surrounding these decisions are typically
confidential.
126. John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987, 1064 (2003) (describing “divisional” patent applications).
127. As one subject explained, “[p]atent pools are for the convenience of licensees in
acquiring patent rights from multiple patent holders at a single rate in a single transaction
as an alternative to negotiating separate license agreements, and the royalties [in our pools]
are the same whether one or more patents is infringed/used . . . Similarly, neither do
royalties increase or decrease based on the number of patents as licensors and patents are
added to the pool or patent expire, and licensors would be unlikely to volunteer their
patents for the benefit of licensees if they did. Instead, there is a royalty rate for a pool
license based on striking a balance between what it takes to retain licensors and offer
reasonable terms to licensees over the course of a license, and this concept is important for
understanding a pool’s operation and success.” Email from Larry Horn, President & CEO,
and Bill Geary, Vice President of Bus. Dev., MPEG LA, LLC to author (July 21, 2017)
[hereinafter Email from Horn & Geary] (on file with author).
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family” royalties—a higher number than a “per-patent” calculation would
produce.128
There are several reasons why patent pools can exert such an influence
on negotiations. One explanation appears to be a widespread understanding
that, if an outsider sued a pool licensee for patent infringement and won,
under several common scenarios, a court would likely look to the patent
pool as a reflection of the value of the outsider’s patent. The court would
assume that, had the outsider been a participant in the standard-setting
process, it would have likely made a FRAND commitment. Microsoft v.
Motorola, discussed earlier, indicates that a court may look to a pool’s rates
for an indication of whether an outsider’s demands are “reasonable,” such
that they satisfy a FRAND obligation.129 (Recall this decision also instructs
that a FRAND commitment is a contract, removing the patent holder’s
power to demand an injunction.)130
A patent pool’s royalty rate could similarly affect an independent patent
holder who is not subject to a FRAND commitment, however. As one
subject explained:
The pool rate defines a ballpark figure for the per-patent royalty
that you can ask. If you come in as an independent licensor and
you demand a multiple of the per-patent royalty the pool is asking
for [relative to the technology being licensed], then you will meet
incredible resistance in the negotiations with the potential
licensees. They will simply refuse to take a license. Then the
licensor could only get companies licensed if it is prepared to sue.
In that case, it needs to defend its case before court and it will need
to show that its royalty is reasonable compared to what the pool is
asking. That is costly, and takes a long time with an uncertain
outcome. Most licensors don’t want to litigate each and every
company and wait for years and years to get their money. So, they

128. A subject interviewed explained that such negotiations should “begin with the
recognition that patent pools are for the convenience of licensees in acquiring patent rights
from multiple patent holders at a single rate in a single transaction as an alternative to
negotiating separate license agreements and the royalties are the same whether one or more
patents is infringed/used.” Email from Horn & Geary, supra note 127.
129. See Susan Decker, Ericsson Tries to Avoid Patent War by Publishing Rates for
5G, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 17, 2017, 11:00 AM), www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201703-17/ericsson-tries-to-avoid-patent-war-by-publishing-rates-for-5g
[https://perma.cc/TR8W-7JC8].
130. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[B]ecause
of the RAND licensing commitment, injunctive relief is an inappropriate remedy for
infringement of standard-essential patents.”).
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are forced to lower their royalties to a level that the market finds
acceptable.131

Another subject made consistent comments, stating that, faced with a high
royalty demand from an outsider, pool licensees may sometimes decide to
“efficiently infringe” the patent, even if it is essential to a standard.132 The
outsider can sue for infringement, that subject explained, but injunctions are
difficult to obtain in these settings, and monetary awards are more
common.133 At this stage, explained the subject, it will be up to a court to
determine the value of the infringed patents. Where might the court look?
Common wisdom is that the pool is a likely source.134
The situation is even more constrained for an outside patent holder that
is also a technology manufacturer, a common situation. To operate, these
patent holders should obtain licenses to the necessary patents. They may do
so through the pool or by contacting the individual patent holders. As
discussed earlier in this Article, some pools have historically required grantback promises from licensees, obligating them to license any essential patent
rights back to the pool. As one subject explained, “a patent holder who also
manufactures products using the pool technology may be constrained by a
grant-back provision if he must sign a license with the pool and will
necessarily grant licenses based on the pool royalty level.”135 Another subject
commented, “an outsider could ask for very high royalties only if it does not
have business exposure and so doesn’t need to become a licensee.”136
Subjects explained that, even in pools without grant-back provisions,
outside licensors who are also manufacturers may experience similar
pressures. The reason lies in the simple fact that the independent must come
to an agreement with the patent holders in the pool. “They will still need
licenses from the pool licensors,” explained one subject:
These pool licensors will say to the independent, “I am a member
of the pool. You are asking on a per-patent basis a multiple of
what we are asking for our patents. So, either we go with my per-

131. Telephone Interview with Ruud Peters, supra note 118.
132. Telephone Interview with Subject #7 (Feb. 23, 2017) (on file with author).
133. Id.; see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392–93 (2006)
(instructing that, contrary to prior judicial practice, judges should not automatically issue
injunctions upon finding patent infringement).
134. Id.
135. Email from Subject #5 to author, supra note 122.
136. Telephone Interview with Subject #3, supra note 124.
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patent royalty or we take yours. If we go with yours, then you need
to pay me your per-patent royalty for the use of my patents.”137

An outside licensor in this position who asks for an unreasonably high rate,
the subject explained, “is shooting itself in the foot.”138
Remarkably, even outsiders who somehow succeed in getting licensees
to agree to very high royalties do not always benefit in the end. The reason,
according to some subjects, is the underreporting of sales. One research
subject explained this through a hypothetical:
Let’s say you have an independent that is commercially not active
and assume that it asks for a relatively high royalty rate and that
licensees agree in the end—because they want to avoid the cost of
litigation—to take licenses. Normally, these licensees will be
required to submit quarterly reports with the number of products
they have sold in that quarter and thus the total royalty amount
they have to pay. If licensees feel that the royalties they have to
pay are too high, they may adjust their reported quantities, so that
effectively their royalty rate comes within the range that they
believe is more fair and reasonable.139

Research subjects explained such underreporting “happens on a large
scale,” even though it violates the contractual obligations of licensees under
their license agreements.140 In part, this is because underreporting is difficult
and costly to detect. The subject quoted above explained that some licensees
are very creative in masking underreporting. “Of course,” he stated, “the
licensor can take measures, such as hiring an independent auditing firm to
check the books of licensees, but that costs a lot of money and takes quite
some time. In countries with different business practices, it’s not always an
easy job.”141
The foregoing explains why, as one subject opined, “an outsider might
be able to negotiate a higher rate, but not that much higher.”142 The head
of licensing at a large technology company that has historically operated
inside and outside of some large pools commented, “if the per-patent rate
is too different from the per-patent pool rate, potential licensees would
rather fight in court than take the license.”143 The subject added, “you may
137. Telephone Interview with Ruud Peters, supra note 118.
138. Telephone Interview with Subject #3, supra note 124.
139. Telephone Interview with Ruud Peters, supra note 118.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Telephone Interview with Subject #3, supra note 124. Here, the term “per-patent”
was used casually and imprecisely. The speaker was referring to per-patent-family or per-
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deviate in practice from the baseline by 30 or 40% but not by 300% for
example.”144
This leads to another observation: the existence of a patent pool not only
sets a baseline for negotiations, but also eliminates the need for an outsider
to search for licensees and vice-versa—tasks that would contribute
significantly to search costs in a world of one-to-one licenses. “We did a lot
of their homework for them,” one pool administrator explained. 145 In
summary, the very existence of the patent pool, in a sense, cuts down on
both search costs and negotiation costs.146 This can help licensees to get a
clear picture of which patents are essential to license.
Interestingly, some research subjects explained that not all outsiders are
holdouts seeking an economic advantage. Some are simply companies that
have large, internal licensing staff who they wish to look out for by reserving
work for them rather than going along with the pool.147 The company might
view both options as equal in terms of the bottom line and yet the option to
go it alone can keep their people employed.
Finally, evidence gathered for this study shows that the decision to
remain outside of a patent pool can raise the odds that a patent holder will
need to litigate. As one research subject commented:
You may also have to litigate more, even though patent pools are
litigating sometimes. If you are alone, you will have to do more
litigation, so you may have more, you know, bad press articles
about you because these companies may also play with the media.
Certain companies would hate to have to litigate by themselves.148

The MPEG-2 case study that follows provides a vivid example of this risk.
In summary, research subjects offered a surprising window into how
patent pools limit the royalties that outside licensors can succeed in
collecting. If the independent is a technology manufacturer, it typically must
limit its demands if it wishes to use the patents in the pool (especially if it
owes a contractual duty to grant-back). If the independent is not a licensee,
the pool’s rate still is thought to be the basis in determining a reasonable
royalty, either under a FRAND obligation or simply as a legal remedy. As
one subject stated, “if the patent holder is not a pool licensee, his asking for
invention rates. See supra notes 124, 125, and accompanying text (discussing the problem
with looking to per-patent rates).
144. Telephone Interview with Subject #3, supra note 124.
145. Telephone Interview with Horn & Geary, supra note 116.
146. Id.
147. Telephone Interview with Subjects #12 and #13 (Feb. 23, 2017).
148. Telephone Interview with Subject #3, supra note 124.
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high royalties will still be rejected by the licensees and his only solution for
trying to get these will be litigation . . . with the associated risks.”149 Finally,
even an outsider that gets licensees to agree to a high rate faces the problem
of underreporting and an increased risk of litigation. One subject summed
the situation up well: “if they want to get some money, then they need to be
moderate.”150
C.

OUTSIDE THE MPEG-2 PATENT POOL (CASE STUDY)

In the earliest days of filmmaking, about fifteen patents covered the
technology needed to record and deliver movies to the public. 151 These
inventions covered flexible film, winding and spooling mechanisms, camera
lenses, and related methods. In 1908, efforts to settle legal disputes between
the two chief owners of these patents led to the formation of “The Motion
Picture Patents Company”—the first of several patent pools that operated
in the film industry of the early 20th century.152
In the 1990s, the rise of digital video boosted not only the quality and
transportability of movies but also the number of patent rights needed to
play them. Many advances made it possible for celluloid and magnetic reels
to be replaced by weightless computer instructions. One achievement,
however, could be credited for the widespread adoption of digital video: the
MPEG-2 video standard. Developed by (and named after) the Moving
Picture Expert Group (MPEG) and a team of engineers and scientists from
leading technology firms, MPEG-2 is a standardized way to describe
motion, light, and sound through sequences of 1’s and 0’s. It is the language
understood by DVD players, cable boxes, smart phones, digital cameras,
online video providers, and video game consoles.
MPEG took form at a January 1988 meeting of the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) and held its first meeting in May
of that year.153 The group, which was open to any interested parties, held
149. Email from Subject #5 to author, supra note 122.
150. Telephone Interview with Ruud Peters, supra note 118.
151. The chief patents were U.S. Patent Nos. 12,192; 12,037; 629,063; 578,185;
580,749; 586,953; 588,916; 673,992; 707,934; 722,382; 673,329; 744,251; 770,937;
771,280; 785,205; and 785,237. See INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS AND TRUSTS 259–65
(William S. Stevens ed., 1914) (listing the aforementioned patents).
152. See Ralph Cassady, Jr., Monopoly in Motion Picture Production and
Distribution: 1908–1915, 32 S. CALIF. L. REV. 325, 329 (1959); see also Jeanne Thomas,
The Decay of the Motion Picture Patents Company, 10 CINEMA J. 34, 34 (1971)
(indicating that The Motion Picture Patents Company formed in 1908 by the emergence
of two factions of the film industry).
153. See Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Public Policy Towards Patent Pools, in 8
INNOVATION POLICY & THE ECONOMY 157, 174 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2008) (“The
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frequent meetings which were widely attended by delegates of leading
technology companies. MPEG required its participants to pledge to license
any patents they might own related to the standard under development at
FRAND terms—a fact that would later have important bearing on one of
its outsiders.154 Over the course of a few years, at meetings held in Berlin,
Australia, New York, Brussels, and Seoul, the MPEG-2 standard took
form. The group produced a final draft in late 1994, and necessary
stakeholders approved it in early 1995.155
Although it took an ensemble of talented engineers to develop MPEG2, the way the technology works is easy to grasp156: movies, television, and
other video are, of course, made up of sequences of still images. Thanks to
a trick of human psychology, when viewed in rapid succession—twentyfour frames per second for film, and thirty frames per second for television
video—the images appear to move.157 Traditional analog movies create this
illusion by storing thousands of images on film or magnetic tape and
flashing them before the viewers’ eyes.158 As a practical matter, however,
often only small areas of any frame in a sequence differ from the frame that
immediately preceded it. Large swaths of a picture—the blue of a sky, or
the green grass on a field, for instance—do not change. The information
that matters most is what has changed between two successive frames.
MPEG-2 cleverly takes advantage of this by formalizing a way to describe
the portions of each image in a series that change from one frame to the
next. The result is a phenomenally efficient method of compressing video,
making for faster transfers over networks and more economical use of
storage space on physical media.
Shortly following MPEG-2’s completion in early 1995, one of the
technology firms that helped develop the standard organized an internal
standard was developed by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) under
the leadership of Leonardo Chiariglione, along with scientists and engineers from many
universities and corporations.”).
154. See id. at 174–75.
155. Lerner & Tirole, supra 153, at 174 (“The standard setting effort began in July
1990, and the final MPEG-2 standard was approved in November 1994.”).
156. For more, see generally JAN VAN DER MEER, FUNDAMENTALS AND
EVOLUTION OF MPEG-2 SYSTEMS: PAVING THE MPEG ROAD (2014) (discussing the
development of MPEG-2).
157. Paul Backaus, The Illusion of Motion, PAULBAKAUS.COM (May 21, 2014),
https://paulbakaus.com/tutorials/performance/the-illusion-of-motion/ [https://perma.cc/
A8RN-WACT].
158. This effect is commonly referred to as “the persistence of vision.” See generally
Bill Nichols & Susan J. Ledermann, Flicker and Motion in Film, in THE CINEMATIC
APPARATUS 96 (Teresa de Lauretis & Stephen Heath eds., 1980).
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working group, the purpose of which was to identify any relevant patents.
With the help of lawyers and engineering consultants from over forty
technology firms, the group identified and reviewed about 8,000 U.S. patent
abstracts and about 800 patents, which had been assigned to over 100 patent
owners.159 This work led to a consensus among the companies involved that
they had found all (or nearly all) patents essential to MPEG-2.160 At its
launch, the MPEG-2 License included 25 patent families consisting of 102
essential patents. These covered many aspects of the standard, including
spatial and temporal compression techniques, and methods of transmission.
After identifying these patents, the group developed a set of agreements
that defined a new patent pool. A new limited liability company, “MPEG
LA,” was formed to administer licensing.161 The group invited holders of all
essential patents to join and made the pool open to any future members that
wished to include standards-essential patents that they owned.162
In April 1997, MPEG LA and the individual patent holders that had
joined the MPEG-2 pool—Columbia, Fujitsu, General Instrument,
Lucent, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Philips, Scientific-Atlanta and Sony163—
submitted a letter to the Antitrust Division of the DOJ, requesting
assurance that their planned pool did not violate the law or otherwise raise
competition concerns. Two months later, on June 26, 1997, the DOJ
responded favorably. Following a careful and lengthy analysis of the
proposed pool, the letter concluded, “[i]t appears, however, that the

159. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 106, § 34.04[C] at 34–50 (“To determine which
patents would be contributed to the pool, a number of firms participating in a ‘MPEG-2
Intellectual Property Working Group’ hired an expert and invited submissions of patents
that might be relevant to MPEG-2 compliance. The expert reviewed some 800 patents
assigned to approximately 100 parties, and ultimately concluded that several of the patents
were ‘essential’ to compliance with the MPEG-2 standard—meaning that there were no
technological alternatives to the claimed technologies. Of the patents identified as essential,
most (27) were contributed to the pool.”).
160. See Letter from Garrard R. Beeney, Sullivan & Cromwell, to Joel I. Klein,
Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 11 (Apr. 28, 1997), https://www.justice.gov/
archive/atr/public/busreview/request-letters/302637.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4J5VAW5Y] (“[T]he proposed licensing arrangement includes most, but not all, MPEG-2
essential patents.”); Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
to
Gerrard
R.
Beeney,
Sullivan
&
Cromwell
(June
26,
1997),
www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/busreview/215742.pdf [https://perma.cc/3753-L3P5]
[hereinafter MPEG-2 Resonse Letter].
161. See A History of Success–A Future in Innovation, MPEG LA,
http://www.mpegla.com/main/Pages/AboutHistory.aspx
[https://perma.cc/EA3MXZ33] (last visited Mar. 11, 2018).
162. Id.
163. See MPEG-2 Response Letter, supra note 160, at 2.
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proposed arrangement will not raise any significant competitive
concerns.”164 The MPEG-2 pool officially launched a short time later, on
July 17, 1997.
Around this time, an outsider emerged. Although Lucent collaborated
on the pool and joined in signing the letter sent to the DOJ, it elected to
license independently.165 Details of this decision are not well documented,
but an interview subject directly involved in the pool offered a helpful
account of when the news was relayed: “on the day of the announcement of
the patent pool’s launch,” he explained, “Lucent told the other members of
the group and MPEG LA that it planned not to join.”166 According to this
subject, one reason for Lucent’s reluctance to join was their successful
internal licensing capabilities. “Lucent was very well known for running a
very strong and successful licensing program with their own portfolio which
may have accounted for their decision,” this subject stated.167 According to
Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole, Lucent’s decision came down to compensation:
Lucent had a large internal licensing department with sufficient
resources to conduct its own MPEG-2 licensing activities.
Moreover, Lucent believed that two of its patents were most
critical to the MPEG standard. Lucent felt that the licensing rate
established by MPEG LA was lower than it could have been and
decided not to join the pool. Lucent estimated that the higher
royalty rates it would be able to charge by not joining the pool
would more than offset the decreased fraction of the MPEG-2
market that would license its technology if it pursued its own
licensing activities.168

Like Lucent, Thomson also initially refused to join to the pool,
preferring to independently license its patents.169 As explained later in this
case study and in the DVD case study that follows, however, it ultimately
joined relatively early in the pool’s history, in July 2002.170
The MPEG-2 pool’s royalty division formula treated all essential
patents as equal in value—a view that may have not been shared by Lucent
at the time.171 As an interview subject at MPEG LA explained, because any
essential patent could block commercialization, all the patents arguably
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See MPEG-2 Response Letter, supra note 160, at 10.
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 106, at 34–49.
Telephone Interview with Horn & Geary, supra note 116.
Id.
Lerner & Tirole, supra note 153, at 176.
Telephone Interview with Subject #3, supra note 124.
Id.
Telephone Interview with Subjects #12 and #13, supra note 147.
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carried an equal value.172 “The patents included in this pool are all essential,”
stated another subject, referring to debates about the issue among
licensors.173 “I don’t think anyone can say that one patent is more essential
than another, because you need them all. They are all blocking.” 174 The
subject went on to note, however, that “this was the first modern-day patent
pool, and there were many who had reasons to be skeptical about its
success.”175
Lucent’s absence from the pool may have fostered some initial doubts
in the market. As a subject at MPEG LA explained, “Lucent’s withdrawal
added yet another element for them to be skeptical about.”176 According to
this subject, MPEG LA allayed these concerns with a straightforward
explanation of the value they were offering:
We told [prospective licensees] that our program was voluntary
and that Lucent had decided not to join. Despite this fact, we
explained that the patents of the eight firms in the pool were
essential, valuable, and worth paying for. We also explained that
we were doing a lot of their homework for them because we were
basically showing them the patent landscape they would otherwise
have to research for themselves.177

“People accepted the license we offered with the eight [patent
holders],” explained a research subject at MPEG LA, adding, “the eight, by
the way, grew rapidly to about ten in about six months.”178 MPEG LA
respected Lucent’s decision to go it alone but kept the door open for them
to join anytime, “in the interest of including as much essential intellectual
property as possible for the benefit of licensees,” a subject at MPEG LA
explained, adding, “the extent to which the pool may have affected Lucent’s
licensing efforts was not clear.”179
Lucent was nevertheless steadfast in remaining an outsider. In March
2003, Alcatel, a French telecommunications company joined the MPEG-2
patent pool as a licensor.180 In April 2006, Lucent and Alcatel agreed on a

172. Id.
173. Telephone Interview with Horn & Geary, supra note 116.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Email from Horn & Geary, supra note 127.
180. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., No. CIV. 02-2060-B(CAB), 2007 WL
2900484, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2007).
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plan to merge their companies.181 Just two months later, with the merger
underway, executives at Lucent realized that unless they acted fast, the
company’s MPEG-2 patents would likely be included in the patent pool by
virtue of Alcatel’s membership. 182 (MPEG LA’s membership agreement
required all members and their present or future “affiliates” to license
essential patents to the pool.)183 To prevent this, Lucent established a trust
in Delaware, which it named the Multimedia Patent Trust (MPT). 184
Lucent was named as a beneficiary. 185 In November 2006, Lucent
transferred its MPEG-2 essential patents to the trust.186
Alcatel-Lucent then sued several computer hardware manufacturers for
infringing the patents held in the trust. The defendant in one suit was
Microsoft.187 There, Alcatel-Lucent filed a motion for summary judgment,
holding that Microsoft’s implementation of the MPEG-2 video standard
in its Xbox video game console was infringing.188 In response, Microsoft
challenged the validity of the patents in the trust and argued for equitable
estoppel based on Lucent’s commitment to license the patents to MPEG
LA.189 Microsoft also argued in the alternative that even if the patents were
valid, they were not essential to the MPEG-2 standard. 190 Microsoft
argued, in other words, that the mere fact that its products abided by the
MPEG-2 standard was not prima facie proof that it had infringed Lucent’s
patents. 191 Finally, Microsoft asserted a series of counterclaims of patent
infringement against Lucent. 192 Ultimately, Alcatel-Lucent was
unsuccessful on both fronts: the court held that the facts did not support a
conclusion that Microsoft’s products infringed Lucent’s and did support
Microsoft’s patent infringement claims.193

181. See id. at *1.
182. See id. at *2.
183. See id. at *4.
184. See id. at *2.
185. See id. at *6.
186. Id. The patents were U.S. Patent Nos. 4,958,226 and 4,383,272.
187. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 544 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (S.D. Cal. 2008).
188. See id. at 1087.
189. See id. at 1094, 1098.
190. See id. at 1102.
191. See id. at 1090–91.
192. See id. at 1096–1103.
193. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 06-CV-0684-H (CAB), 2008 WL
2872738, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 23, 2008).
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Matters grew worse for Alcatel-Lucent and MPT in 2007, when
MPEG LA sued them for breach of contract in Delaware.194 The complaint
alleged that Alcatel-Lucent had promised to license all MPEG-2 patents
that it could—an obligation that MPEG LA argued Lucent had failed to
fulfill when it transferred the patents to MPT. The complaint stated, “the
only purpose of the transfer was to avoid Alcatel’s contractual commitment”
in order “to extract additional royalties from MPEG-2 licensees.”195
In late March, 2010, the suit settled—“literally in the middle of trial,”
as one subject involved recounted. 196 As described in a court filing, the
settlement agreement required the MPT to subject the patents at issue in
the Action pursuant to MPEG LA’s usual procedures for determination of
whether any of them were “MPEG-2 Essential Patents” or “MPEG-2
Systems Essential Patents.” 197 MPT agreed that if the patents were
determined to be essential, it would join the pool.198
Thomson, as mentioned earlier, had initially elected to keep its patents
outside of the MPEG-2 pool. They joined long before the episode involving
Alcatel-Lucent’s trust, however, in July 2002. 199 One research subject
explained, “Technicolor [Thomson] was originally participating in
discussions of the MPEG-2 Video patent pool, they stayed out and went as
an independent. But later on, they experienced that they were not as
successful as MPEG LA at sales, and they joined MPEG LA. So, they
came back.”200 Another subject directly involved with the decision explained
that Thomson joined because it was impressed by MPEG LA’s success in

194. Press Release, MPEG LA, MPEG LA Sues Alcatel Lucent for Breach of
MPEG-2
Patent
Pool
Contractual
Obligations
(Nov.
5,
2007),
http://www.mpegla.com/main/Pages/LegalAction.aspx [https://perma.cc/XD8N-P6P3].
195. Amended Verified Complaint ¶¶ 6–7, MPEG LA, L.L.C., v. Lucent, No. 3317VCL, (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 2010), 2010 WL 519600; see also Scott M. Fulton III, MPEG2 Patent Holder, Licensing Agent in High-Def Codec Dispute, BETANEWS (Nov. 6,
2007), https://betanews.com/ 2007/11/06/mpeg-2-patent-holder-licensing-agent-inhigh-def-codec-dispute/ [https://perma.cc/JKD8-W9JV].
196. Telephone Interview with Horn & Geary, supra note 116; see also Susan Beck,

We Surrender! After Two Days, Alcatel-Lucent Waves the White Flag in Patent
Showdown, AM. LAW. (Mar. 26, 2010, 12:00 AM), https://www.law.com/
americanlawyer/almID/1202446807481/ [https://perma.cc/Z2WF-PVB3].
197. Press Release, MPEG LA, MPEG LA Lawsuit Against Alcatel Lucent Settled
(Mar. 29, 2010), http://www.mpegla.com/main/Pages/LegalAction.aspx.
198. Id.; see also Exhibit A, Lucent Technologies, Multimedia Patent Trust v.
Gateway, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. P 75977 (C.C.H.) (S.D. Cal, October 1, 2007), 2007 WL
9431594.
199. Telephone Interview with Subject #3, supra note 124.
200. Telephone Interview with Subject #2 (July 15, 2017) (on file with author).
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its early years.201 Interestingly, Thomson’s need to become a pool licensee
may have also factored into their decision to join. “Thomson needed to
become in its own right a licensee,” added another subject.202 “They made a
lot of set-top boxes in that era, and they used MPEG-2. The good news is
that Thomson became a licensee.”203
As for Lucent, staying outside of the MPEG-2 pool appears to have
been a costly strategy. According to multiple subjects interviewed, Lucent
was unable to collect royalties that were appreciably higher than what they
would have received as a member of the pool.204 This was because the pool
provided a signal to licensees of what the value of the patents relating to the
technology was.205 Licensees apparently reasoned that, because any essential
patent could block commercialization, all patents were approximately equal
in value. 206 Meanwhile, by suing licensees of the pool, Alcatel-Lucent
exposed itself to counterclaims that led to findings of patent infringement
on its part.207 The same court’s finding that Lucent had not been infringed
upon, meanwhile, raised fresh questions about the essentiality of some of
Lucent’s patents.208 Added to all of this was Lucent’s opportunity cost. “In
the period between 1997 when they decided to join and 2010 when this
lawsuit forced them to join,” explained an interview subject, “they left huge
amounts of money on the table. Because you can’t go back to get royalties
that you missed when you should have been in the pool. Because that money

201. Telephone Interview with Subject #3, supra note 124.
202. Telephone Interview with Horn & Geary, supra note 116.
203. Id.
204. Telephone Interview with Subjects #12 and #13, supra note 147. Consistently,
the court found no evidence that Alcatel-Lucent had demanded “supracompetitive” prices,
arguing that this was just attorney speculation. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., No.
CIV. 02-2060-B(CAB), 2007 WL 2900484, at *17 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2007). This is
consistent with the accounts laid out earlier, that Lucent was unable to use its outsider
status to demand supracompetitive prices. See id.
205. Telephone Interview with Horn & Geary, supra note 116.
206. This conclusion was drawn generally from discussions with interviewees.
207. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 544 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1120 (S.D. Cal.
2008).
208. Steven Reynolds, Setting the Record Straight on Upcoming Patent Rights Trial,
LUCENT-ALCATEL CEO BLOGS (Mar. 2010) (“That court decided that the MPT patents
were not infringed by Microsoft’s MPEG2 products. Obviously, and as is clarified by
Bloomberg through its correction, Alcatel-Lucent can’t be risking something that a court
already determined that the MPT is not entitled to receive. The amount quoted is
completely unrelated to the current trial.”).
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goes out the door to licensors.”209 In the end, all of Lucent’s patents ended
up in the pool.210
D.

OUTSIDE THE DVD PATENT POOLS (CASE STUDY)211

In the late 1980s, the ascendance of digital music CDs over cassette
tapes set the stage commercially and technologically for Digital Versatile
Disc (DVD) technology.212 Although analog systems that stored and played
back movies from optical discs had existed since the late 1970s, none were
widely adopted in the United States.213 As a result, through the early 1990s,
most Americans owned a VHS player—a device that played movies stored
in analog form on cumbersome cartridges of magnetically charged tape.214
When it was introduced in the late 1990s, DVD marked a leap ahead in
quality and convenience, offering full-length movies in the then-new
MPEG-2 format on elegant plastic discs the same size as CDs.215 Although
it was eventually usurped by high-definition Blu-Ray discs and streaming
video, DVD was a commercial giant during its reign: by 2006, about eightyone percent of American homes had a DVD player, a figure that surpassed
that of VCR player ownership in that year.216 The Microsoft Xbox and Sony
PlayStation—two dominant videogame consoles of the 1990s and 2000s—

209. Telephone Interview with Horn & Geary, supra note 116.
210. Id.
211. This discussion pertains specifically to DVD Video and not recordable DVD
media. For more information about recordable DVD standards, see Stephan Gauch, + vs Ǧ
: Dynamics and Effects of Competing Standards of Recordable DVD-Media, in THE
DYNAMICS OF STANDARDS 47 (Tineke M. Egyedi & Knut Blind eds., 2008).
212. See JIM TAYLOR, DVD DEMYSTIFIED 38 (2d ed. 2001) (“It was not until the
development of compact disc digital audio in the 1980s that optical media again proved its
worth in the world of bits and bytes, setting the stage for DVD.”).
213. Julie Flaherty, Bittersweet Times for Collectors of Laser Disc Movies, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 29, 1999), https://nyti.ms/2v7Gk1e [https://perma.cc/K7YR-NU92]
(commenting on the success of DVD). One subject for this Article stated, “[l]aser discs
with movies . . . did not have success on the market. Many companies thought before the
launch of DVD that DVD would not take off. It has been a good surprise for everyone.”
See email from Alfred Chaouat, Senior Vice President of Licensing, Technicolor, to author
(July 24, 2017).
214. See generally TAYLOR, supra note 212, at 19, 24–37 (discussing the history of
VHS and other video technology and reporting that 87% of all U.S. households owning at
least one VCR as of the book’s publication date, which was 1998).
215. See id. at 60–70 (discussing the introduction of DVD players in the United
States).
216. See, e.g., DVD Players Overtake VCRs, CNN MONEY (Dec. 26, 2006, 9:34
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2006/12/26/technology/dvd_vcr [https://perma.cc/VT9LEJEP].
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also relied upon the DVD format for game data.217 This success resulted
from the work of two patent pools, one lone licensor, and many
manufacturers who licensed from all three.
Warren Lieberfarb, former President of Warner Home Video, is widely
credited for his instrumental role in encouraging the development of the
DVD standard.218 During his distinguished career working at leading film
production companies—first as a financial analyst and later as a senior
executive—Mr. Lieberfarb was, according to former colleagues, deeply
intrigued by the idea of a digital video disc for decades.219 He encouraged
Toshiba to develop a prototype of the technology, which was demonstrated
to electronics companies and industry stakeholders in 1994. 220 Despite
initial skepticism, the film and technology industries came to support the
development of a new standard, thanks in large part to Mr. Lieberfarb’s
lobbying. 221 After further research and experimentation, two teams
composed of leading technology firms emerged with the most promising
solutions: Philips and Sony co-developed a format it called “Multimedia
CD” or “MMCD”; 222 Toshiba, meanwhile, asked Hitachi, Matsushita
(Panasonic), Mitsubishi, Victor (JVC), Pioneer, and Thomson to help it

217. See, e.g., Steve Traiman, It’s All in the Games, BILLBOARD MAG., Mar. 31,
2001, at 62, 69 (noting that Nintendo’s Gamecube console relied on a variant of DVD that
used discs with smaller diameters).
218. See, e.g., Martin Dale, Warren Lieberfarb: The History of DVD and Cable
Networks Highlights the Tremendous Value of Classic Films, VARIETY (Oct. 12, 2014,
11:08 AM) (“Warren Lieberfarb is universally recognised as the ‘architect of the DVD’ . .
. .”), http://variety.com/2014/film/global/warren-lieberfarb-the-history-of-dvd-andcable-networks-highlights-the-tremendous-value-of-classic-films-1201328060/
[https://perma.cc/6RN8-Z7MH]; James Greenberg, Private Sector; The Would-Be King
of DVD, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/24/business/
private-sector-the-would-be-king-of-the-dvd.html
[https://perma.cc/9KWV-F7AW]
(reporting that many in the film industry credit Lieberfarb “with dreaming, cajoling and
bullying the DVD into existence”). Similarly, a research subject for this study emphasized
Lieberfarb’s importance in bringing about the DVD. See email from Alfred Chaouat to
author, supra note 213.
219. See Greenberg, supra note 218 (quoting the former executive of AOL Time
Warner as saying that Mr. Lieberfarb’s focus on the DVD was “the most consuming
manifestation I’ve ever seen in an individual”).
220. Id.
221. See TAYLOR, supra note 212, at 37–39 (noting that optical discs rely on a method
of storing information through the use of divots to represent bits, a principle understood
since Charles Babbage’s seminal work in developing digital programmable computers).
222. See id. at 40–60; Letter from Garrard R. Beeney, Sullivan & Cromwell, to Joel I.
Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (July 29, 1998), https://www.justice.gov/
atr/page/file/1020341/download [https://perma.cc/8SGD-ZDVW] [hereinafter DVD3C
Request Letter].
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further develop its 1994 prototype.223 This work led to a format the group
called the “Super Disc” or “SD.” 224 Anxious about the possibility of a
wasteful format war like the one that slowed the adoption of VHS over a
decade earlier, Apple, Microsoft, Sun Microsystems, Dell, and other
manufacturers, urged these two teams to combine.225
Cooperation came in 1995, but it would be short-lived. Sony and
Philips agreed to join the “SD” group to work on a single format that would
incorporate elements of both the MMCD and the SD formats. 226 The
collaborators agreed to call the new format the DVD. 227 Notably, this
development work was not mediated by a standard-setting organization, but
instead, was largely a private venture that operated under the auspices of
“The DVD Consortium” (later renamed “The DVD Forum”). 228 As a
result, details of the DVD standard were kept confidential and available
only to licensees who signed a nondisclosure agreement.229 Two subjects
directly involved independently confirmed that participants in the DVD
Forum were subject to a FRAND obligation, however. 230 The group
finalized the first DVD specification in late 1995.231

223. Email from Alfred Chaouat to author, supra note 213.
224. Letter from Carey R. Ramos et al., Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison
to Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice 6 (Oct. 9,
1998),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/01/08/302365.pdf
[https://perma.cc/269A-WBFT] [hereinafter DVD6C Request Letter]; see also
Electronic Giants Battle On, NEXT GENERATION, Nov. 1995, at 19 (discussing the battle
between MMCD and the SD formats).
225. See TAYLOR, supra note 212, at 48–49 (discussing reconciliation between the two
camps).
226. See id.
227. See id. at 50.
228. Id.; Telephone Interview with Alfred Chaouat, Senior Vice President of
Licensing, Technicolor (July 19, 2017) (explaining the change in name).
229. Discussing the DVD standard, one research subject emphasized the difference
between “technical essentiality” and “commercial essentiality.” The former, the subject
explained, relates to patents that are necessarily infringed by any device that follows a
standard; the latter, by contrast, describes patents that are infringed by devices that follow
the standard in a manner that makes the device commercially desirable or cost effective.
Telephone Interview with Horn & Geary, supra note 116 (“There’s a lot of mechanical
stuff in a DVD player. So, let’s say the standard recites that you have to be able to jump
across ten tracks within a certain number of milliseconds but it doesn’t specify how you
could do that. There may be many ways you could actuate the system to make that jump,
some of which are preferable to the manufacturer. Those practices may be commercially
essential.”).
230. Telephone Interview with Subject #2, supra note 200; email from Alfred Chaouat
to author, supra note 213.
231. See TAYLOR, supra note 212, at 51.
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The collaborators wished to pool their patents under a single license,
but they were unable to come to an agreement. At a June 1996 DVD
conference, speakers announced that the ten companies had agreed to form
a patent pool in order to streamline licensing.232 “The goal was to form one
pool,” stated one subject directly involved.233 On August 2, 1996, Sony and
Philips announced that they would begin licensing their patents jointly and
invited the other eight companies to join in.234 Pioneer later joined Sony
and Philips, and the three companies formed a pool called the “DVD3C
Licensing Group.”235 Six of the remaining companies formed a pool they
called the “DVD6C Licensing Group.”236 Thomson, meanwhile, decided to
license independently.237
A research subject directly involved with the attempt to form a single
pool commented, “ultimately, the goal of a single pool failed because various
groups had different views as to how to share the royalties.”238 This subject
went on to explain that “the fundamental difference was whether the
royalties should be divided on a per-patent basis only or should also take
into account the total contribution of a party to the optical technology
concerned.”239 Another subject with knowledge of the episode commented,
“frankly, they couldn’t agree on royalties. That was the problem. They were
never able to get there.”240 Yet another individual involved explained:
The discussions for formation of a potential pool including all
DVD Forum companies took many months, did not reach a
consensus and finally led to the formation of two separate pools .
. . in great part because Philips would not accept to decrease its
share in the intended pool. Thomson decided that it was better off
financially, and as a respected licensor, to continue to license its
patents separately, in a single license incorporating all
technologies used in the DVD player.241

For its part, Thomson appears to have had a few reasons for remaining
independent. A research subject explained that in part, the company viewed
certain patents it held as having special value:
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

See id. at 54.
Telephone Interview with Subject #2, supra note 200.
See TAYLOR, supra note 212, at 56.
See generally DVD3C Request Letter, supra note 222 (describing the pool).
DVD6C Request Letter, supra note 224 (describing the pool).
Telephone Interview with Subject #3, supra note 124.
Telephone Interview with Subject #2, supra note 200.
Id.
Telephone Interview with Horn & Geary, supra note 116.
Email from Subject #5 to author, supra note 122.
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All essential patents in a patent pool have, in general, the same
value. At that time, Thomson still owned some fundamental
patents addressing the way the pits are read by an optical laser
beam, which, from our perspective, was much more valuable than
the DVD essential patents dealing with the multi-angle view, for
example. So, we decided not to join any of the DVD patent
pools.242

In addition to this, however, Thomson felt the most comfortable
working with its own licensing staff purely because very few other
companies involved in the pools had a long track record for this kind of
work. The research subject continued:
Another reason why Thomson did not join the 6C patent pool is
the uncertainty about who would be the agent. We knew that
Philips had great experience and talent through their joint CD
licensing program with Sony. We were not so sure if the other 6C
pool members had the ability to manage a patent pool well,
however. Also, we were already managing our own successful CD
player licensing program. The decision to join a pool has to do
with the rate and your share of it, but also how you assess the
capabilities of the licensing agents. Licensing agents are not all
equal.243

As a result, manufacturers of DVD players would need to obtain
essential patent licenses from both pools and Thomson.
Despite the fragmentation, the three licensors requested royalties that
resulted in roughly comparable royalty rates relative to the number of
patent-families or inventions licensed. In a letter requesting review and
approval from the DOJ, for instance, the 3C licensing group (Philips, Sony,
and Pioneer) stated that their pool would contain 115 DVD player
patents. 244 Based on discussions with a subject involved and a review of
essentiality lists, this figure refers to patent families, each of which may have
included individual patents granted in different countries and some
divisionals as well.245 The 3C pool stated that it would charge DVD player
242. Email from Alfred Chaouat to author, supra note 213. This subject went on to
note that Thomson spearheaded an important Blu-Ray patent licensing pool, however, and
emphasized that the decision to join or pool or remain independent is done “one a caseby-case basis.”
243. Telephone Interview with Alfred Chaouat, supra note 228.
244. See DVD Business Review Letter, supra note 100, at 4 (“[T]here are 115 patents
in all for the manufacture of DVD players, and 95 for the manufacture of the discs
themselves.”).
245. Email from Alfred Chaouat to author, supra note 213; see also Licensing: DVDVideo/ ROM Disc (Joint), PHILLIPS, http://www.ip.philips.com/licensing/program/29/
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manufacturers 3.5% of net sales with a minimum of $7 per unit sold, which
would drop to $5 per unit sold beginning in the year 2000.246 Because most
DVD players sold for under $200, the minimum dollar rates were the most
important after several years.247 Before the year 2000, the 3C pool collected
a per-patent-family rate of about $0.06.248 From the year 2000 onward, the
pool yielded a per-patent-family rate of about $0.043 for each player.249 The
DOJ replied favorably on December 16, 1998, stating that the 3C pool
raised no antitrust concerns.250 With these assurances, the DVD3C pool
began offering licenses soon after.
The 6C group (Hitachi, Matsushita, Time Warner, Toshiba, and
others) submitted a request for business review to the DOJ at around the
same time, on October 9, 1998. 251 They would license forty-four DVD
player patents at a rate of 4% of net sales per player, with a minimum of $4
per player.252 This figure refers to patent families, each of which may have
included individual patents granted in different countries and divisionals as
well.253 Again, because DVD player prices were generally low enough, it is
safe to assume that the minimum price per player was the most relevant.
Based on this, the DVD6C group collected per-patent-family rates of
approximately $0.09 for players. The DOJ responded favorably on June 10,
1999.254 “By reducing what would otherwise be six licensing transactions to
dvd-video-rom-disc-joint [https://perma.cc/6TXR-8UQ4] (last visited Mar. 11, 2018)
(offering a list of patents granted in different countries).
246. See DVD3C Request Letter, supra note 222.
247. Telephone Interview with Ruud Peters, supra note 118. For a more detailed view
of these numbers, see the tables and accompanying discussion infra Section IV.B.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Interestingly, the DOJ addressed the outsider concern in its response, although
not with respect to the two DVD pools or Thomson. Instead, it discussed the possibility
that a member of the DVD3C pool might refuse, at some future time, to license essential
patents it might acquire—outsiderism by an insider, as it were. The DOJ did not believe
this would seriously dampen the efficiencies of the pool. See DVD3C Response Letter,
supra note 244, at 14 n.58 (“Transaction costs to licensees would almost certainly be
somewhat lower if these later patents were included in the pool, instead of being subject to
separate negotiations. However, the fact that this pool might not enable the realization of
all potential efficiencies of pooling patents in this area does not mean that the efficiencies
that it does create are insubstantial or that the arrangement is anticompetitive or
unlawful.”).
251. See DVD6C Request Letter, supra note 224.
252. Id. at Exhibit 2 (on file with the author) (listing the forty-four patents).
253. Id. at 13.
254. See Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Carey
R. Ramos, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison (June 10, 1999),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2012/08/01/2485.pdf.
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one,” the DOJ wrote, “the pool would reduce transactions costs for
Licensors and licensees alike. By ensuring that each Licensor’s patents will
not be blocked by those of the other five, the pool would enhance the value
of all six Licensors’ patents.” 255 In the DOJ’s view, it seemed that some
cooperation was better than none.
This leads to Thomson. According to a subject directly involved, prior
to July 2002, Thomson licensed both its MPEG-2 and DVD patents
independently. 256 At that time, the rate it charged DVD player
manufacturers for both sets of patents was $1.7 for each DVD player sold.257
In July 2002, Thomson decided to join the MPEG-2 patent pool, as
discussed earlier,258 and it lowered the rate of its DVD patents to 1.3% of
the net selling price of each player, with a minimum of $1.3 per unit.259
Thomson’s portfolio included 10 essential patent families.260 As with the
two pools, each patent family included numerous patents filed in different
countries as well as divisionals.261 At a rate of $1.3 per sale, this equated to
a per-patent-family rate of $0.13.
Although this effective per-patent-family rate is higher than that of the
3C and 6C pools, a research subject explained that some licensees who held
patents Thomson wished to license paid Thomson lower rates. “We
concluded some bilateral licenses (i.e., including a license back for
Thomson) at a lower rate than the standard rate when the licensee owned
relevant DVD patents that we were using in our products. Otherwise, we
succeeded to license our patents at the standard rate.” 262 This comment
connected with an opinion shared by another research subject, who stated,
You need to understand that this is the asking price. In bilateral
negotiations there’s always a difference between the asking price
and the price you finally settle on—a negotiation margin. When
you have a pool, by contrast, you always have a fixed rate.263

[https://perma.cc/23X3-S793] [hereinafter DVD6C Response Letter] (responding
favorably to the proposed pool).
255. Id.
256. Telephone Interview with Research Subject #3, supra note 228.
257. Id.
258. Press Release, Thomson Multimedia, Thomson Joins MPEG LA Patent Pool
(July 11, 2002), www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/vprr/0204/02048954.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WNS2-EMC3].
259. Telephone Interview with Alfred Chaouat, supra note 228.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Email from Alfred Chaouat to author, supra note 213.
263. Telephone Interview with Subject #2, supra note 200.
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The per-patent-family rates for players collected by all three licensors
were not vastly different in part because there was a mutual awareness that
the aggregate cost for licensees could not be too high. Simply put, the
licensors set their royalties in light of one another. The DVD6C pool
signaled this when it wrote to the DOJ, “[t]he royalty rates proposed by the
DVD pool are reasonable, especially when compared to the rates proposed
by the MPEG-2 pool for patents used in DVD products or when compared
to the rates proposed by the Sony/Philips/Pioneer 3-party DVD pool.”264
When asked if this showed that the 6C group looked to the 3C group for a
baseline, a research subject directly involved commented, “I think that is a
reasonable conclusion.”265 A licensing expert directly involved with licensing
at Thomson also explained, “Thomson’s rate was set based on the rates set
up by the two DVD patent pools.”266 In short, there was signaling among
the two pools and Thomson.
A 2004 dispute in the District of Delaware involving the 6C pool
illustrates the willingness of licensees to push back against independent rates
they perceive as unreasonable in light of pool rates. Matsushita Electrical
Industrial Co. v. Cinram International, Inc. involved a company that sought
to license certain DVD disc patents directly from the individual members
of the 6C pool.267 The pooling agreement allowed the companies to do this.
The licensee was upset, however, because the per-patent-family rate
requested by each licensor outsider of the pool was higher than the perpatent-family rate that the pool offered.
Cinram maintains that the structure of the 6C Pool discourages
individual licenses because such licenses would undercut the pool
price. . . . Cinram explains that the cost for individual licenses
from four of the six 6C Pool members totaled $0.11. Cinram
points out that this total substantially exceeds the $0.05 per disc
royalty that it currently pays for a 6C Pool License, thereby
making individual licenses entirely impractical.268

Interestingly, the District of Delaware rejected this argument based on
its finding that the rates charged by the pool fell well below the “objective
value” of the patents.269
264. DVD6C Request Letter, supra note 224, at 20.
265. Telephone Interview with Subject #2, supra note 200.
266. Email from Alfred Chaouat to author, supra note 213.
267. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Cinram Int’l, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 370 (D.
Del. 2004).
268. Id. at 378.
269. Id. at 379 (“The Second Circuit has stated that the only valid test to prove that an
alternative is too costly to be a realistic alternative is whether the price for such a license,
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The DVD licensing story fails to support the theory that outsiders will
ask for royalties so excessive that licensees will be unable to bear the
aggregate cost. Rather, in line with the MPEG-2 story, this episode seems
to show that the pricing information published by patent pools (i.e., royalty
rate announcements) sets a baseline for negotiations that take place outside
of the pool and even rates charged by complementary pools. As explored in
Part IV, this spillover benefit may be viewed as an unappreciated benefit of
patent pools.
IV.

ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF OUTSIDERS

The foregoing study shows that the royalty rates set by patent pools tend
to limit the royalty rates that outsiders ask for and receive. This finding
directly conflicts with the theory that outsiders will tend to undermine the
benefits of patent pools. This is not to say, however, that the rate charged
by outsiders and secondary pools is not relatively higher than the rate
collected by individual members in a pool. In the DVD episode, for
instance, some licensors collected relatively more than others. Should the
higher relative rates in such settings be viewed as an “outsider premium?”
To aid regulators, this Part introduces a technique for estimating the cost
that a licensee either incurs or saves in the presence of an outsider. This
technique is then applied to real-world financial and industry data collected
in the foregoing study. The results indicate that, surprisingly, licensees may
pay less in settings where cooperation among licensors is slightly
fragmented than they would pay in a setting where outsiders were induced
to join a single pool.
A.

A METHOD FOR ESTIMATING OUTSIDER COSTS AND BENEFITS

Do licensees pay more when outsiders are present than they would pay
to a unified pool? This question asks one to compare reality as it is to a
hypothetical world where no outsiders or secondary pools exist—i.e., a
grand coalition where all relevant patent holders are joined. Evidence
in an objective sense, is higher than the value of the intellectual property rights being
conveyed. In accord with this reasoning, the court concludes that the per disc royalty
differential only causes the individual licensing option to be an unrealistic alternative if it
is higher than the value of the DVD rights conveyed. The court finds that the facts at bar
do not show this to be the case.”) (internal citations omitted); Buffalo Broad. Co. v. Am.
Soc. of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 744 F.2d 917, 927 (2d Cir. 1984) (“Even if the
blanket license is objectively the ‘better buy’ for most users, the program license would be
a realistic alternative so long as it was fairly priced for those who might find it preferable
for reasons other than price. But if the program license were available only at a price beyond
any objectively reasonable range, the ‘bargain’ nature of the blanket license would not
immunize it from characterization as a restraint.”).
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presented in the foregoing case studies indicates this is an unrealistic ideal,
of course. Some outsiders simply prefer to go it alone, sometimes for
idiosyncratic reasons. Unrealistic as it may be, however, a grand coalition
hypothetical allows for a head-on quantitative assessment of the outsider
concern. The following discussion presents a method of comparing the costs
that a licensee incurs in settings with and without outsiders.
The greatest challenge in developing a picture of a grand coalition is
determining what total royalty rate such a patent pool would charge
licensees. Research subjects confirmed that the royalty rate set by a patent
pool strikes a balance between what it takes to retain licensors and to offer
reasonable terms to licensees over the course of a license.270 Recall from Part
II of this Article that the amount licensors receive in most modern pools is
determined by a formula, rather than through individual deals with each
licensor who joins.271 Earlier scholarship has shown that nearly all patent
pools, historical and contemporary, have adopted this “rough and ready”
approach to royalty divisions.272 The two most common methods pools use
to apportion royalties are “per-capita” and “per-patent.” 273 Many patent
pools use combinations of these two approaches as well.274 As a research
subject for this Article explained, some pools will divide, say, twenty percent
of their incoming royalties equally among the patent owners and the
remaining eighty percent may be divided based upon the number of patents
each member has licensed. 275 A subject explained that a problem with a
simple “per-patent” approach is that it encourages members of the pool to
file many “divisional” patent applications relating to just one invention
because doing so increases the raw number of patents upon which members’
royalties are based.276 To remedy this issue, subjects explained, some recent
pools have limited the number of patents that may be included in per-patent
calculations, either by limiting the number of divisionals to be counted, or
basing the division not on the raw number of patents but instead on the
number of patent families contributed by a licensor. 277 In light of these
observations, a foundational assumption in this exercise is that a patent pool
that includes all relevant patents will include a royalty-division formula of
some kind.
270. Email from Subject #11 (July 27, 2017) (on file with author).
271. Mattioli, supra note 12, at 439–55.
272. See id. at 462.
273. See id. at 446–47.
274. Id.
275. Telephone Interview with Subject #8 (July 15, 2017) (on file with author); email
from Alfred Chaouat to author, supra note 213.
276. Id.
277. Id.
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This leads to a second assumption: in order to entice all outsiders to join
as members, a grand coalition would need to deliver to all outsiders royalties
that are at least as great as those they can already collect outside of the pool.
One could argue quite fairly that perhaps a slightly lower rate than this
would be enough to entice some outsiders to join, in light of the transaction
cost savings that patent holders enjoy by belonging to pools. On the other
hand, this study has revealed that most outsiders enjoy the efficiencies of
robust internal licensing departments. For this reason, it is difficult to guess
whether an outsider would be willing to give up some of its royalty returns
in exchange for the efficiencies of belonging to a pool, and if so, how much.
For these reasons, this exercise proceeds on the assumption that, to induce
all licensors to join, a single pool must deliver to the highest-paid outsider
royalties at least as great as those that outsider could draw on its own.
As a threshold matter, then, it is necessary to determine who the
highest-paid licensor is and how much that licensor collects for each
product that its licensees sell. In the course of conducting the studies in this
Article, I received directly from research subjects and documentary sources
a wealth of industry pricing data as well as the royalty rates charged by
patent pools and individual licensors. In the practical example that follows,
data from the DVD licensing industry are presented.
To aid in this analysis, it is helpful to represent the foregoing
assumptions as equations. Equation 1, below, shows the total per-licensee
royalty rate that a patent pool using a per-capita royalty division formula
would need to charge in order to bring in an outsider that collects a perlicensee rate of “RateOutsider.” Here, n represents the total number of
patent holders in the pool.
Equation 1: Royalty Rate Charged by Unified Pool Using Per-Capita Formula

ܴܽ ܥܲ݁ݐൌ ܴܽ ݎ݁݀݅ݏݐݑܱ݁ݐൈ ሺ݊  ͳሻ
This equation assumes that a patent pool is driven strictly by a royalty
division formula and that it has not made a special agreement that has
resulted in compensating the outsider more, comparatively, than the other
members. This assumption might be challenged, but it seems reasonable, as
existing members of a pool would likely disfavor disproportionately
benefiting a reluctant member. For comparison, Equation 2, below, shows
the total per-licensee royalty rate (“RatePP”) under a per-patent approach.
Here, “NumInside” is the number of patents in the pool before the outsider
joins, “RateOutsider” is the royalty rate the highest-paid outsider draws, and
“NumOutside” is the number of relevant patents owned by that outsider.
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Equation 2: Royalty Rate Charged by Unified Pool Using Per-Patent Formula

ܴܽ ܲܲ݁ݐൌ ሺܴܽݎ݁݀݅ݏݐݑܱ݁ݐȀܲܽݎ݁݀݅ݏݐݑܱݏݐ݊݁ݐሻ ൈ ሺܰ݁݀݅ݏ݊ܫ݉ݑ
ܰ݁݀݅ݏݐݑܱ݉ݑሻ
To calculate the royalty rate that would be charged by a unified pool
that uses a combination of the per-capita and per-patent approach, one can
multiply the “RatePP” and “RatePC” values by their relative weights (e.g.,
20% and 80%) and take the sum. The sum is referred to below as
“RateHypo.”
Next, one can compare these hypothetical rates to the royalty rate that
licensees pay all licensors in reality. This latter amount, represented by
“RateActual” below, can be derived by adding the individual rates charged
by each pool and each licensor. The difference between these values is a
licensee’s total royalty cost or savings by working with a single pool as
opposed to working with a pool and one or more outsiders.
Equation 3: Calculation of Rate Increase Due to Outsider Inclusion in Pool

ܴܽ ݉ݑ݅݉݁ݎܲ݁ݐൌ ܴܽ ݕܪ݁ݐെ ܴ݈ܽܽݑݐܿܣ݁ݐ
It is also necessary to consider transaction costs. For a licensee, working
with a single pool involves just one transaction, compared to the multiple
transactions necessary to work with, say, two pools and an outsider. The
transaction costs conserved (“TCostsSaved”) by working with a unified
pool, or grand coalition (“TCostsGC”), instead of a partial coalition
involving multiple pools and outsiders (“TCostsPC”) can be represented as
follows:
Equation 4: Transaction costs conserved under unified pool (per-licensee)

ܶ ݀݁ݒܽܵݏݐݏܥൌ ܶ ܥܲݏݐݏܥെ ܶܥܩݏݐݏܥ
Bringing this all together, one can determine the total increase or
decrease in cost to each licensee (“OutsiderPremium” below) by subtracting
the transaction costs conserved by the rate increase incurred:
Equation 5: Calculation of Outsider Premium

ܱ ݉ݑ݅݉݁ݎܲݎ݁݀݅ݏݐݑൌ ܴܽ ݉ݑ݅݉݁ݎܲ݁ݐെ ܶ݀݁ݒܽܵݏݐݏܥ
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If “OutsiderPremium” is positive, then licensees are better off under
current conditions (licensing from the pool and outsider) than they would
be if the outsider were induced to join the pool; if “OutsiderPremium” is
negative, then licensees should wish for the pool to raise its rates to induce
the outsider or outsiders to join.
Ultimately, the analysis boils down to comparing two numbers: the costs
licensees incur in reality against those they would incur in a setting with a
single pool that has raised its rates to pull in outsiders.
B.

ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF OUTSIDERS ON DVD LICENSEES

This discussion applies real-world financial and patent data gathered
from the study in Part III to the method described in the preceding
discussion. The result is a rough estimate of the impact, in cost, of outsiders
on DVD licensees. The results are surprising: arguably, licensees fare better
in the slightly fragmented licensing landscape that exists than they would in
a setting with a single pool. The implications of this conclusion are explored
further toward the end of this Article.
Drawing upon the study in Part III, the table below lists the number of
patent families and royalty rates charged by DVD patent holders. Although
research subjects indicated that outsiders such as Thomson sometimes
agreed to accept rates lower than the rates they asked for, this study will rely
on the “asking price” because this was reportedly the typical amount
Thomson collected.
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Table 1: DVD Video Licensing Rates (Per Unit Sold)
ROYALTY
LICENSOR

PATENT

ROYALTY

FAMILIES

RATES

RATES
(DOLLARS
PER-PATENTFAMILY)

$7 before yr. 2000
DVD3C
(3 LICENSORS)
DVD6C
(6 LICENSOR)

115

(alt: 3.5% NSP278)
44

THOMSON /
TECHNICOLOR
(1 LICENSOR)

$5 after yr. 2000

10

minimum: $4
(alt: 4% NSP)
$1.3
(alt: 1.3% NSP)

$0.06
(later $0.043)

$0.09

$0.13

In addition to the minimum per-patent-family royalty rates that appear
in Table 1, it is helpful to determine the actual per-patent-family royalty
rates for years in which the minimum did not apply. As Table 1 shows, all
licensors based their royalty rates on a percentage of the net selling price
(NSP) of a DVD player until that percentage fell below a certain number—
$100 in the cases of DVD6C and Thomson. Drawing upon sales data
published by the Consumer Electronics Association, Table 2 reflects the
patent royalties a licensor would have collected from each licensor for an
average-priced DVD player in the years 1997–2004.279 This range of years
was selected because it coincided with the introduction and growth of
DVD.

278. NSP signifies “Net Selling Price.” This is shown as an alternate measure of
royalties owned. If the percentage shown in the table multiplied by a product’s NSP exceeds
the minimum, the higher number was owed. Looking to the first row for example, if a
DVD player was sold in the year 2001 for $250, then 3.5% of this would have equaled
$8.75. Licensees would have owed this sum because it is higher than the minimum of $5
listed for that time.
279. See Cost of DVD Players, DATA360, http://www.data360.org/dsg.aspx?Data_
Set_Group_Id=497 [https://perma.cc/65T8-87PX] (last updated Sept. 7, 2006).
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Table 2: DVD Video Licensing Costs (1997–2004)
(asterisks indicate that the minimum licensing rate has been reached)

YEAR

AVG.

DVD6C

DVD3C

THOMSON

PRICE OF

ROYALTIES

ROYALTIES

ROYALTIES

DVD

PER UNIT

PER UNIT

PER UNIT

PLAYER

SOLD

SOLD

SOLD

TOTAL
LICENSING
COSTS PER
UNIT
SOLD

1997

$489.97

$19.60

$17.15

$6.37

$43.12

1998

$390.18

$15.61

$13.66

$5.07

$34.34

1999

$270.00

$10.80

$9.45

$3.51

$23.76

2000

$201.55

$8.06

$7.05

$2.62

$17.74

2001

$165.00

$6.60

$5.78

$2.15

$14.52

2002

$142.00

$5.68

$5.00*

$1.85

$12.53

2003

$123.00

$4.92

$5.00*

$1.60

$11.52

2004

$108.60

$4.34

$5.00*

$1.41

$10.76

These amounts may now be compared to the hypothetical royalties that
a single pool would charge licensees.
How much would a single pool need to charge to entice the highestpaid outsider to join? First, one must determine which entity is the highestpaid licensor. Thomson’s profits for each product sold appear in Table 2. It
is possible that a member of the DVD3C or DVD6C pool earned more
than Thomson for each product sold. It is difficult to know this, however,
because the formulas that apportion royalties among the three members of
the DVD3C pool and the six members of the DVD6C pool are
confidential. 280 If the pools relied upon simple per-capita divisions,
however, then Thomson always collected more than any member of the 3C
or 6C pool for each net sale. If the formulas were more complex (which the
business review letters indicate), then it is possible that one member of the
3C group could have collected more than Thomson at any time.281 In the
interest of keeping the final estimates conservative, however, one may select
280. See DVD3C Response Letter, supra note 244, at 6 (“The allocation of royalties
among the Licensors is not a function of the number of patents contributed to the pool.”).
281. See id.
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Thomson’s royalties as a measure of the highest amount any member would
need to collect in a unified pool.282
Now it is useful to consider what total rate a patent pool using the
various royalty-division rules outlined in the prior discussion would need to
charge to ensure that Thomson received at least the level of royalties that it
was able to collect independently. First, we can consider a formula based
upon the number of patents infringed by a product, defined earlier in
Equation 2. As explained earlier in this Article, the per-patent-family rate
charged by a pool is a more accurate indicator of the value each member
brings to the table than a per-patent rate and is reflective of the formulas
that pools use in practice. For that reason, this example considers a formula
that apportions royalties based on the number of patent families
contributed. Thomson, as reported in Table 1, would have ten patent
families to contribute to the pool. Therefore, the per-patent-family rate
charged by the pool can be calculated simply by dividing Thomson’s return
(in Table 2) by ten. A flaw in this approach, of course, is the fact that patent
composition may have changed during the period (1997–2004). As
explained earlier, patents may have been added to or removed from pools.
As a result, the calculation is Table 3 is approximate.

282. This assumption does not hold in all cases, as the 3C or 6C pools reach their
royalty minima. However, the limitation of this assumption does not undermine the
conclusion that pools consolidate at the highest royalty rate.
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Table 3: Hypothetical Royalties Per Product Sold (Pro-Rata Formula)
TOTAL

YEAR

PER-

DVD6C

DVD3C

THOMSON

LICENSING

PATENT-

ROYALTIES

ROYALTIES

ROYALTIES

COSTS

FAMILY

(PER UNIT

(PER UNIT

(PER UNIT

(PER UNIT

RATE

SOLD)

SOLD)

SOLD)

SOLD)
(“RATEPP”)

1997

$0.64

$28.03

$73.26

$6.37

$107.65

1998

$0.51

$22.31

$58.31

$5.07

$85.68

1999

$0.35

$15.44

$40.37

$3.51

$59.32

2000

$0.26

$11.53

$30.13

$2.62

$44.28

2001

$0.22

$9.46

$24.73

$2.15

$36.34

2002

$0.19

$8.14

$21.28

$1.85

$31.27

2003

$0.16

$7.04

$18.40

$1.60

$27.04

2004

$0.14

$6.20

$16.22

$1.41

$23.83

What would the unified pool need to charge if it relied upon a per-capita
formula? Referring to Equation 1, the information in Table 1, and the
assumption that Thomson is the highest-paid licensor, the amounts under
this hypothetical can be calculated, as shown in Table 4. To clarify, the
DVD3C column receives three-times Thomson’s rate, and the DVD6C
pool receives six-times. Total licensing costs to a licensee appear in the
right-most column.
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Table 4: Hypothetical Royalties Per Product Sold (Per-Capita Formula)
DVD6C

DVD3C

THOMSON

TOTAL LICENSING

ROYALTIES

ROYALTIES

ROYALTIES

COSTS (PER UNIT

(PER UNIT

(PER UNIT

(PER UNIT

SOLD)

SOLD)

SOLD)

SOLD)

(“RATEPC”)

1997

$38.22

$19.11

$6.37

$63.70

1998

$30.42

$15.21

$5.07

$50.70

1999

$21.06

$10.53

$3.51

$35.10

2000

$15.72

$7.86

$2.62

$26.20

2001

$12.90

$6.45

$2.15

$21.50

2002

$11.10

$5.55

$1.85

$18.50

2003

$9.60

$4.80

$1.60

$16.00

2004

$8.46

$4.23

$1.41

$14.10

YEAR

A comparison of the rates appears below:
Table 5: Actual Versus Hypothetical Royalty Cost to Licensees Per Unit Solid

YEAR

RATEPC:

RATEPP:

RATEACTUAL:

HYPOTHETICAL

HYPOTHETICAL RATE

ACTUAL COST

RATE TO LICENSEES

TO LICENSEES UNDER

TO LICENSEES

UNDER PER-CAPITA

PRO-RATA

ALLOCATION

ALLOCATION

1997

$43.12

$63.70

$107.65

1998

$34.34

$50.70

$85.68

1999

$23.76

$35.10

$59.32

2000

$17.74

$26.20

$44.28

2001

$14.52

$21.50

$36.34

2002

$12.53

$18.50

$31.27

2003

$11.52

$16.00

$27.04

2004

$10.76

$14.10

$23.83
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The increase in licensing costs under a unified pool can be derived by
subtracting RateActual in the first column from either RatePC or RatePP,
depending on which royalty-division formula one wishes to consider in the
hypothetical. The result is RatePremium, defined earlier in Equation 4.
Turning to transaction costs, in 2017 Robert Merges and I gathered
financial data from the largest patent pool administrators in the United
States that can be directly applied to this estimate. Based on our findings,
the average licensee incurs about $35,000 in costs per year dealing with a
patent pool. 283 These amounts stem from administrative fees tied to
reporting sales data, making royalty payments, and the like.284 (The patent
pool eliminates negotiation and search costs.) This example assumes that
licensees incur similar ongoing transaction costs when working with
individual outsider licensors. Added to this, in the case of an individual
outsider, is the initial cost of negotiating an agreement. A widely-cited
estimate suggests the average cost of an average patent licensing would be
about “$50,000 per licensee per patent.”285 The evidence revealed in this
Article suggests the amount might be lower, however, as a pool effectively
places a ceiling on the negotiations, which could simplify the process. An
annual cost can be estimated by dividing this upfront negotiation cost over
some period of time during which the patent has commercial value. If one
assumes that period of time to be ten years, for instance, the average annual
cost is $5,000. To keep the estimate conservative, however, we may assume
a higher value of, say, $15,000. In summary, this example assumes that a
licensee spends an average of $35,000 in transaction costs for each pool it
licenses from and approximately $50,000 in transaction costs working with
one outside licensor.286
Applying these numbers to the DVD example, one may assume,
conservatively, that each licensee incurred about $120,000 in annual
administrative costs to work with two patent pools and one outsider (i.e.,
$35,000 in costs for one pool, plus $35,000 for a second pool, plus $35,000
in administrative costs of dealing with the outsider, plus an initial cost of
$15,000 in negotiation costs with the outsiders). Under a unified pool, the
annual cost would drop to $35,000. Referring to Equation 4, the total

283. See Merges & Mattioli, supra note 15, at 322–23.
284. See id.
285. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV.
1495, 1507 (2001) (“[A] reasonable estimate of the cost of negotiating a license might be
$50,000 per licensee per patent.”).
286. It is important to emphasize that, industry-wide, patent pools profoundly reduce
transaction costs by reducing the number of necessary transactions and negotiations. See
Merges & Mattioli, supra note 15, at 320.
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annual transaction costs saved (TCostsSaved) would be approximately
$85,000.
To compare the annual transaction costs conserved to the higher rate
discussed earlier and defined in Equation 4, it is necessary to estimate the
total annual costs that a licensee might incur under the higher rate. (Until
now, this discussion has discussed the rate in terms of per-unit sales). One
can develop a ballpark figure by multiplying the RatePremium number by
the total number of units that a licensee might expect to sell each year.
Publicly available sales data reported in Form 10-K filings and annual
reports makes it possible to draw such an estimate for an average licensee.
In the year 2001, for instance, Sony reported selling thirty-nine million
DVD players. 287 In the interest of keeping the estimate conservative,
however, one can consider far lower average sales numbers. Table 6, below,
assumes an annual average sales figure of just one million units during the
relevant years.
Table 6: Calculation of Annual Outsider Premium (based on average annual sales of
1,000,000 units)
OUTSIDER

RATE

PREMIUM

PREMIUM

(ADDITIONAL
YEAR

TOTAL COST
TO LICENSEE

TCOSTSSAVED
(ANNUAL)

RATE

(BASED ON

PREMIUM

ANNUAL

(PER-SALE)

AVERAGE

UNDER UNIFIED

SALES OF 1M

POOL)

UNITS)

1997

$20.48M

$90,000

$20.58

$20.58M

1998

$16.26M

$90,000

$16.36

$16.36M

1999

$11.24M

$90,000

$11.34

$11.34M

2000

$8.36M

$90,000

$8.46

$8.46M

2001

$6.88M

$90,000

$6.98

$6.98M

2002

$5.87M

$90,000

$5.97

$5.97M

2003

$4.38M

$90,000

$4.48

$4.48M

2004

$3.24M

$90,000

$3.34

$3.34M

287. See SONY CORP., SONY CORPORATION ANNUAL REPORT 2001 at 39 (2001),
www.sony-latin.com/corporate/SOLA/acerca/infocorporativa/pdf/info_financiera/
ar2001e.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5HF-2YV9].
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These calculations indicate that licensees should far prefer the current
environment, in which they must license from two pools and one licensor,
to the hypothetical setting where one pool has lured in all outsiders with
higher royalties. This conclusion is directly at odds with warnings that some
industry analysts gave at the time fragmentation in the DVD licensing
landscape occurred.288
In summary, the small outsider margin, multiplied across a pool in the
manner pools commonly distribute royalties, leads to a significant price
difference for licensees. If one assumes that a single pool would need to
merely offer outsiders an amount equal to what they can collect outside of
the pool and if one also assumes that such a pool would rely upon a
commonly used basis for the division of royalties (as opposed to
disproportionately compensating the outsider), the result could mean much
higher rates than licensees currently pay. Outsiders may not be powerful,
but multiplication is.
C.

THE VIRTUES OF IMPERFECT COOPERATION

The foregoing suggests a provocative idea with implications that reach
beyond patent markets: partial cooperation may, in some settings, be
preferable to complete cooperation. In the context of patent pools, this
condition is met when the marginal premium charged by an outsider
multiplied according to the royalty-sharing rules in a pool (to lure in the
outsider) exceeds the transaction costs that licensees would save by dealing
with a single licensor. The case of DVD patent licensing appears to meet
these conditions. This does not reflect the power of outsiders but rather that
of modest arithmetic: multiplied across a pool according to the most
commonly used royalty-division formulas, the small outsider margin can
yield a significant total price increase.
It would be a mistake to conclude that robust patent pools that contain
many essential patents are not extremely helpful. To the contrary, as
discussed earlier, Robert Merges and I have estimated that the average
transaction cost savings of a modern patent pool is on the order of $400 to
$600 million.289 The foregoing discussion presumes a partially integrated
pool taking steps to draw in a reluctant outsider. The takeaway is that the
benefits pools offer are not lost or even undermined simply because an
outside licensor also exists. Assuming no independent competitive concerns
288. See Sony, Philips Break Ranks, Prepare DVD Licensing Fees, OPTICAL
MEMORY NEWS, Aug. 13, 1996 (“The price of digital videodisk (DVD) technology may
balloon if other patent holders follow the lead of Sony Electronics and Philips Electronics
NV and set licensing fees for their DVD patents, warn industry analysts.”).
289. See Merges & Mattioli, supra note 15, at 322.
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exist, regulators should assume that the patents that are within pools belong
there, and the patents held by outsiders are not a cause for concern. By
setting a baseline for outside negotiations, pools prevent these outsiders
from upsetting the careful balance the pools set for their members and
licensees. The fact that some patent holders prefer not to join a central pool
is not necessarily a bad thing—not for licensees, not for other patent
holders, and not for the pool. Antitrust regulators concerned by recent
scholarship on patent pool outsiders should consider this in their evaluation
of patent pools.
Scholars in other areas of law and policy might take something away
from this too. Contrary to conventional wisdom, there may exist in any
given market for complementary rights an optimal level of diffusion of
ownership. Jonathan Barnett has explored this concept at a high theoretical
level in a compelling and thought-provoking 2009 article. 290 Somewhere
between the ideal of a grand coalition and the proverbial anticommons,
there may exist middle positions where partial coalitions work alongside
outsiders, subtly influencing one another in ways that are helpful or even
optimal for all involved. These settings may superficially look messy and
plagued by disagreements. As this study has shown, however, looks can be
deceiving.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article has examined a question fundamental to law and policy:
how do individuals who decline to join cooperative groups affect the good
those groups can do? In the context of patents, this is a deeply important
question because it challenges the belief that regulators have shaped their
policies around—i.e., that patent holders can privately remedy the high
transaction costs that pervade technology licensing.
Antitrust regulators have long assumed that outsider patent holders that
decline to join pools do not disrupt the benefits that patent pools offer.
Against this backdrop, a rising chorus of critics has theorized compellingly
that outsiders are more harmful than regulators assume. By demanding
royalty rates that far exceed those requested by the pool, these theorists
argue, outsiders quietly undermine the transaction cost savings the pool
delivers to licensees. As the theorists see it, outsiders work both sides of the
deal, demanding high royalties from licensees while at the same time
pressuring pools for a healthier cut of the profits. This theory suggests that

290. See generally Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation Markets
Select Innovation Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 387–91, 432–37 (2009).
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the mere presence of an outsider of multiple pools should cast doubt on the
efficiencies and benefits that a pool under examination can offer.
By applying an ethnographic approach, this Article has revealed an
intimate and surprising look at the reality of this situation. The most
important finding is that outsiders are not as powerful as the theorists have
guessed. This is because the royalty rate charged by a patent pool is a
powerful signal to those outside of the pool (including courts) of the
reasonable value of all patents concerned.
Meanwhile, it seems that licensees are willing to resist and defy outside
licensors that ask for rates far out of step with a prominent pool. As research
subjects explained, some licensors work independently because they are
highly motivated to “get their money fast.” 291 These licensors are
understandably eager to avoid the delays and costs of pursuing a patent
infringement suit against a licensee. Moreover, suing for infringement in
this context can be risky: as the Lucent episode shows, an aggressive outsider
strategy can backfire, leading to validity challenges and counterclaims for
infringement. As one subject explained, being an outsider can also lead to
negative press that a company might prefer to avoid.292 Added to this is the
relative difficulty of obtaining an injunction, even when infringement is
found. The general view shared by subjects is that courts will tend to look
to a patent pool for a ballpark sense of the value of the patents infringed. It
is no wonder that the licensing rates charged by outsiders in the DVD and
MPEG-2 episodes were roughly in line with those of the pools they
operated alongside.
The impetus to keep royalties reigned-in is even stronger for outside
patent holders who are also licensees of a pool. As the DVD study shows,
Thomson (a manufacturer) was highly successful in conducting outside
licenses overall, but it lowered its asking price when making deals with
patent holders whose patents it wished to license. A patent pool that
includes a grant-back clause for licensees would make this a contractual
obligation.
Finally, an outside licensor who, despite these many countervailing
forces, succeeds in getting licensees to agree to pay a high rate still must
contend with underreporting of sales. As research subjects explained,
underreporting is common (it is costly to monitor and detect), and it tends
to nudge payments from licensees to outsiders to be in line with pool rates.
The examination of royalty rates and prices in Part III brings these
findings into stark relief. The data analyzed support the qualitative insights
291. Telephone Interview with Subject #8 (July 15, 2017).
292. Id.
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shared by research subjects: the per-patent-family rates charged by two
pools and one independent licensor were all within a similar range.
Moreover, to bring all patent holders in, a single pool may have had to raise
its royalty rates in a manner that would have resulted in an overall price
increase for licensees. This is not because the outsider advantage is large,
but rather, because of how pools divide royalties: the small margin needed
to draw in an outsider, multiplied across a pool in the manner pools usually
distribute royalties, leads to a significant difference in price. The existing
licensing landscape, imperfect as it might seem, may be more desirable than
more aesthetically pleasing alternatives.
Putting this all together, cooperation among patent holders is not an
all-or-nothing game. Contrary to theory, outsiders and secondary pools do
not appear to undermine the benefits that patent pools offer. This is because
patent pools have a quiet but powerful influence on negotiations that take
place “poolside,” so to speak. This is why the gentle fragmentation among
licensors that pervades technology licensing is mostly harmless, probably
inevitable, and sometimes actually preferable to the alternative. Antitrust
regulators who must evaluate patent pools should find this knowledge
helpful. This finding can also be helpful to scholars concerned by outsider
problems in many other areas of law and policy. An ethnographic approach
like the one followed here can reveal aspects of an outsider situation that
theory alone does not capture. Sometimes, the collective will of a group
overpowers individual self-interest; sometimes, an outsider is also a good
neighbor; sometimes, a little cooperation is not only better than none, but
also better than more.
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